IGNATIUS AND CHURCH AUTHORITY

By PHILIP ENDEAN

THE TEAM MEETING ON DAY THREE of an eight-day retreat. One of Teresa's retreatants—she calls him 'Martin' to protect his confidentiality—turns out to be an Anglican priest deeply disturbed by the ordination of women. The question he is asking himself is whether or not he should 'come over to Rome'. Teresa, a cradle Roman Catholic, in fact herself feels called to ordination. She is managing to listen to Martin reasonably non-directively, but finding it a strain. Have the others any suggestions as to how she should handle the situation?

Various ideas emerge. 'This is not the sort of issue that should be handled in a retreat—try and get him to let go of it'; 'Didn't somebody once say that the Exercises could be given to Lutherans?'; 'I wonder how all this fits in with the Rules for Thinking with the Church—after all, we Roman Catholics must be somehow more right than the others—but it's all very difficult, isn't it.' The conversation meanders uneasily and inconclusively until the subject is changed. Teresa feels better for having shared the problem, and carries on just trying to support Martin as best she can. On day seven, Martin prays over the temptations of Christ. He realizes that 'coming over to Rome' would amount only to the big gesture that solves nothing, and decides to stay put as an Anglican, at least for the time being.

I have invented this example, but it seems in no way far-fetched. The uncertainties underlying it turn up in multiple forms. Whatever policy retreat houses adopt on intercommunion, it is an uncomfortable issue—or at least should be. Moreover, given that the Exercises can rightly be taken as a paradigm of all pastoral care, the problem of the role and limits of (Roman Catholic) Church authority arises whenever a person's attitudes and way of life, more or less reflectively, differ from ecclesially sanctioned norms.

Ignatian scholarship reflects these practical uncertainties. Historically, how is it that a movement which came to be a byword for ecclesial obedience—Congar believes that Ignatius invented the

term 'hierarchical Church'[1]—had, at its beginnings, so many problems in establishing its own orthodoxy? Systematically, how does one interrelate two Ignatian convictions: that the Creator acts directly with the creature, and yet that one should be prepared to 'abandon all judgment' and obey our holy mother Church?[2] Ignatius can write of vocational choice in terms of God our Lord 'moving my will and putting what I must do into my soul' (Exx 180.1). The question, therefore, cannot but arise: 'What if God puts into my soul something of which an ecclesiastical superior disapproves?' Moreover, what are we to make of the testimony of those who are not Roman Catholics?

> It matters little . . . whether the retreatant is Catholic or Protestant, theologically clued-up or ignorant. When he or she comes face to face with God in that First Week in silence and serious prayer the persona is cracked open and the shadowlands begin to be revealed.
>
> The disposition which Ignatius requires of magnanimity and generosity towards God on the part of the retreatant and his insistence on a non-judgmental attitude in the retreat-giver make for a relationship in which difference of church affiliation matters not at all and in which ecumenism can thrive.[3]

Whether or not we can unreservedly endorse such statements, we certainly lack a theoretical account of the role of the Church in Ignatian spirituality adequate to our current experience. In what follows, I shall try firstly to explore the senses in which Ignatius did and did not have a coherent vision of Church authority. I shall then make some suggestions towards a contemporary Ignatian ecclesiology.[4]

Ignatius's statements and policies

On issues of theoretical ecclesiology, the Ignatian texts are singularly unhelpful. Within the retreat as such, Ignatius makes but one ecclesiological point: a vocational discernment can take place only between things that are,

> in themselves matters of indifference or good, and which do service in the struggle (*militen*) within the holy mother hierarchical Church—and which are not bad or repugnant to her (Exx 170.2).

As for the so-called Rules for Thinking with the Church, both the early Directories and the ways in which the rules are formulated

suggest that they were designed not for use during the Exercises as such but rather as guidance for the period after them, particularly applicable for those working among heretics.[5] In this context, Ignatius's teaching is notorious:

> If we are to be right in everything, we must always hold that the white which I see—we must believe it is black if the hierarchical Church determines it so, believing that between Christ our Lord, the bridegroom, and the Church, his bride, it is the same spirit which governs and directs us for the salvation and well-being of our souls, because our holy mother Church is directed and governed by the same Spirit and Lord of ours that gave the ten commandments.[6]

One could add a little more from Ignatian letters, but substantially these two quotations encapsulate all Ignatius had to say about the Church. As such, they are obviously incomplete. Speculatively, major questions are begged. What is meant by something which the hierarchical Church 'determines'? Are there some acts or 'determinations' of hierarchical authority guaranteed as being uncorrupted by sin or error?[7] If so, how do we incorporate this belief into a credible understanding of divine action and human freedom? How do we distinguish these privileged occasions from other occasions where authority speaks and where, perhaps, disobedience is the only ethically defensible course? What is the relationship between the divine guidance embodied in hierarchical directives and the direct action of God in our prayer-experience? Are the Exercises just irrelevant for contemporary prophets? Arguably it is of faith that these questions are somehow in principle answerable, but Ignatius gives us almost no help in this regard. And mainstream Roman Catholic theology has hardly progressed beyond him.

It must also be said that Ignatius's ecclesiological statements far from adequately reflect his practice with regard to the papacy as Superior General of the Society. Raymund Schwager, the Swiss Jesuit theologian, is now best known for his work in soteriology, in particular for his pioneer attempts theologically to interpret the theories of René Girard on violence and religion. However, his doctoral thesis, published in 1970, was a stimulating work on Ignatius's ecclesiology—a study that now shows its age but has yet to be superseded. In the fourth chapter, Schwager contrasts what Ignatius said with what Ignatius did: his authoritarian statements about obedience with his well-documented and thorough resistance

to various initiatives, some of which came from the Holy See, to appoint Jesuits as bishops. Schwager concludes that Ignatius's *lived* ecclesiology centred on service to the Church rather than obedience to it. Ignatius's behaviour implies a vision of the Holy Spirit as working *both* through the directives of authority, *and* through his own desires. These two modes of divine guidance could interrelate in a number of different ways: authority could spontaneously approve an individual initiative; authority could be persuaded by diplomatic lobbying; exceptionally, the Spirit could, for reasons not vouchsafed to us, be inspiring authority and the individual in different ways; the individual could be given a general desire which authority then specified; or, finally, the individuals and authority could embark on a process of common discernment.

> For him (Ignatius) the hierarchical Church could be a source of direct, specific inspiration, or merely provide a framework not to be overshot, or a great deal in between. What mattered for him, therefore, was not any *one* of these ways of relating, nor any *one* of these possible functions of the Church, but rather the recognition that it is the one divine Spirit that works in such diverse ways.[8]

In other words, the understanding of the Church by which Ignatius lived was a great deal more subtle, interesting and plausible than that which we find on the surface of his writings—particularly as even Schwager's account needs to be extended in order to accommodate the workings of the evil spirit in the Church and in the human heart. Ignatius himself came nowhere near formulating his vision of the Church satisfactorily.

It follows that if we are to understand *historically* how Ignatius's charism was incorporated within institutional Catholicism, we have to invoke a common-sense principle with which, however, lovers of theory will always be uncomfortable: it is possible for human beings to act in deeply intelligent and authentic ways without understanding fully what they are doing. No one in the sixteenth century would have been able to formulate the matter in anything like Schwager's terms. Ignatius's movement established itself because both its own members and the wider Church were able, more or less consciously, to live with open-endedness and uncertainty in a way that can never be cleanly distinguished from irrationality. Much depended on Ignatius's ability to forge relationships with influential people, a matter of such things as diplomatic

skill, personal holiness, his own relatively exalted social position and courtly training, luck, and the fact that others co-operated. The Society stayed within Roman Catholicism, not so much because its reflective theology was different from that of other groups which did not, but rather because it was able to establish its good name and win trust within the Roman Catholic world. The theological basis remained implicit.

Revealing is Ignatius's handling of crisis in 1538, when rumours circulated in Rome that the companions were Lutheran preachers in disguise. The charge was soon informally discredited, but Ignatius was frustrated in successive attempts to get an official exoneration. Finally, he had a long audience with Paul III, talked to him about the problem, and was finally successful in his request for public proceedings. The outcome vindicated Ignatius's group.[9] This episode is quite misinterpreted if it is seen simply in terms of principles regarding the theology of grace. At this point, prior to Trent, the Roman Catholic theological scene was thoroughly confused. Rather, in a situation of unclarity, Ignatius is establishing public credibility and winning respect.

It is this human reality that provides the key for a proper interpretation of Ignatius's more abstract statements of principle, not vice versa. Taken at the level of principle, what Ignatius says is obviously inadequate; even the most fervent ultramontanes, whatever they say, are in practice but selectively obedient. Ignatius and the early Jesuits acted on an unreflected, perhaps barely conscious conviction that their innovativeness had its place only within institutional Roman Catholicism. Thus they worked to build up the human links while leaving the theoretical issues largely to one side. What they said was crude and underdeveloped. They lived out of something much subtler which they could not properly understand or articulate.

The nature of ecclesiological statements

The first, and perhaps most important moral to be drawn from the above is concerned with the kind of truth which statements about the Church have. It was not simply an accident, or a matter of regrettable ignorance, that the early Jesuits did not understand their own lived relationship to the Church. A certain unfinishedness is essential to ecclesiology, however legitimately we strive for an ever greater understanding. To talk about the Church is to talk about how believers relate to each other under God. As such,

ecclesiological language must inevitably be pluralist, ambivalent, changeable and open-ended. Pluralist, because each human being and each local community is called into a unique form of relationship with God; ambivalent, because the language we use will reflect our chequered histories of grace and sin and the conflicts inherent in all deep relationships; changeable, because we change over time and consequently so does our sense of God and of others; open-ended, because it is of faith that we can never stop growing in grace, never exhaust the mysteries of God and of each other.

This may sound like a confusion of Christianity with agnosticism or anarchy. In fact, however, I am simply insisting that the integrating focus of our life together as Christians is a mystery which we cannot control or understand. There certainly are rights and wrongs, but what counts as such varies according to situations. Ask the members of an average Sunday congregation what they think happens during the Eucharist, or what they think a priest is, and the answers one gets are likely to be both fragmentary and chaotically diverse. Then allow further for the diversity of centuries and cultures. Nevertheless, despite all the inadequacy and variety of such expressions, Christianity is committed to the view that it is the one God who is present in all of that. And, though all of us stand in constant need of growth and conversion, it cannot be presumed that the fruits of such conversion are uniform.

Ignatius's most significant statement ecclesiologically, then, comes not in the Rules for Thinking with the Church, but rather in the presupposition which he placed before the Principle and Foundation:

> In order that both the one giving and the one receiving the Spiritual Exercises should be of more help to each other and draw more benefit from each other, it is to be presupposed that every good Christian is more prone to salvage what the other puts forward than to condemn it. And, if they cannot salvage it, they are to ask how the other understands it, and, if the other understands it in a bad way, correct them with love; and, if this is not enough, they should seek all appropriate means in order that what is put forward is understood in a good way and thus salvaged.[10]

The text is difficult linguistically, but there is evidently a sense of the diversity of the ways in which people express their faith, a conviction that they are normally talking sense—or at least that there is some good subjective reason for their error—and a belief

that mutual growth comes through interaction. Ecclesiological language—indeed perhaps all language about God—has to be understood in terms of the relational reality it articulates, and must not be pressed too far. We would all laugh at the pedant who, on hearing Romeo's famous lines about Juliet being the sun asked what part of her corresponded to the rays.[11] We understand the lines only when we empathize with Romeo's love. But analogous errors can arise all too easily in theology. Moreover, the image of the Church implied in Ignatius's advice is that of a body permanently on mission, permanently expanding, indeed permanently working through reform.

Distinguished Ignatian scholars as otherwise diverse as Cándido de Dalmases and John O'Malley have pointed up Ignatius's fundamental lack of interest in controversial theology. The way to approach heretics was to invite them towards conversion of heart, bracketing the speculative issues.[12] I would suggest that this well-documented trend is not to be understood in terms of some kind of preference for the 'pastoral' over the 'theological'. Rather, even theologically, there are good grounds for that option. Christian mission is not primarily the conveying of propositional truths, but the facilitation of relationship—a relationship articulated in a variety of ways whose logic created individuals will never fully comprehend.

It follows also that what Ignatius and his companions actually wrote about the Church was a function of their own personal and cultural situation. They did not give the Exercises to people for whom the limitations of ecclesiastical authority raised acute questions of faith, and did not therefore make any serious effort to meet what we perceive as a serious existential problem. For them it was just self-evident that anything good was ecclesial and vice versa. Writing to Borgia, Ignatius speaks of God's *santísimos dones*, God's holiest of gifts. Strikingly, allegiance to the Church seems to fit quite spontaneously into a list of other good things:

> intensity of faith, of hope, of love; spiritual rejoicing and repose; tears; intense consolation; the raising up of the mind; impressions or illuminations from God, together with all the other spiritual relishings and intuitions that lead to such gifts, and together with humility and reverence towards our holy mother, the Church, and towards the rulers and teachers who have been appointed within her.[13]

Moreover, Ignatius often seems uncritically to accept a hierarchical notion of society. In another letter to Borgia, this time dealing with moves to make Borgia a cardinal, Ignatius writes of his firm conviction, confirmed in prayer, that the step proposed by the emperor should be resisted:

> Despite all this, I have believed and still believe that there would be no inconsistency at all were it to be the divine will that I should set myself in this direction and others on the opposite one, with the result that this dignity was given to you. It could be the same divine spirit moving me this way for some reasons, and others in the opposite way for other reasons, with what the emperor has in mind thus coming about. May God our Lord act in the whole thing in such a way as will nevertheless constitute his greater praise and glory.[14]

Significantly Ignatius just presupposes that, in a conflict situation, constituted authority has priority.

Consequently, a responsible theological interpretation of Martin's situation must make allowances for very great differences between the ecclesial and cultural contexts of our own time and of Ignatius's. We are different people, and hence we interrelate differently with each other and with our God. Martin's case, and indeed Teresa's, turn largely on issues that would not have been of any great conscious significance for the early Jesuits. Feminism was surely unknown to them. Within Roman Catholicism as practised, the nature of the ordained priesthood and its relationship to the priesthood of all believers was not called seriously into question. Protestantism was just obviously heresy.[15] It is not that the early Jesuits would have rejected the idea that one could have an authentic God-given vocation to be a schismatic priest; rather, the question would never have occurred to them. Ignatius's genius gave us a spiritual pedagogy open to the diversity of ongoing experience. To be faithful to that pedagogy is not a matter of slavishly repeating what Ignatius said, but rather of using his method to make creative Christian sense of our own very different world.

Solidarity with a sinful Church

One major difference between Ignatius's situation and our own is surely that we have become all too uncomfortably aware of ecclesial authority's limitations. There is no obvious *a priori* reason

why official Church prescriptions may not be predominantly conditioned by misinformation or sinfulness—even if it reflects an elementary lack of charity always to presume that this is the case. Moreover, modern technology has made it possible for central Church authority to influence local Churches in a way that would have been quite impossible in the sixteenth century, giving the rhetoric of devotion to the hierarchical Church a bite which Ignatius could not have imagined. The point lurks behind many of the controversial issues in current Church life: sexual morality, the disciplines surrounding ministry, the appointment of bishops, and so on. Roman Catholicism's lack of serious intellectual and legal mechanisms for dealing with the limitations of hierarchs is one of the most important remaining obstacles to ecumenical reunion.

Instinctively we conceive the conflicts that arise in terms of experience against tradition or law, of private judgment against individual authority. There are, as it were, two self-contained, independent sources purporting to give access to 'the will of God', and the anguishing problem arises when they seem to deliver different conclusions. This long-standing way of looking at the issue may, however, be seriously misleading. Take the case of Teresa herself, a woman who feels called to priestly ordination even when the present discipline of her Church does not allow this. The crucial point is this: even as she 'experiences' a call which runs counter to the directives of ecclesial authority, that experience is and remains radically dependent on ecclesial tradition. She could not even *have* the experience of being called, or hold even *false* theological beliefs about the particular question of women's ordination, were she not socialized into the Christian community and dependent on it. In her disagreement, she remains inevitably in a kind on solidarity. 'Experience', even the most intimate, has a public aspect: it depends on language and community.[16]

If we apply the point theologically, it follows, firstly, that 'private judgment' has an irreducibly ecclesial dimension. All knowledge claims presuppose a background of unquestioned assumptions: theologically, this background is provided in part by Christian revelation and the community which preserves it. Secondly, what is guaranteed is not so much the truth of any particular judgment, whether of the individual or the hierarch, but rather its meaningfulness. Boris Becker's brilliant tennis is radically dependent on the ongoing activity of those who regulate the laws of the sport. Only through their activity does it even make sense to say that he plays

tennis. Yet, self-evidently, he plays tennis far better than any of tennis's bureaucrats, and, further, it is abundantly possible that individual legislative decisions by those authorities are open to criticism. Similarly, the Christian life as a whole is radically dependent on the more or less formal mechanisms by which Christian tradition is conveyed. But that is not to say that those most closely responsible for such mechanisms have a privileged access to truth regarding how the tradition should be continued, nor that those mechanisms themselves might not be open to considerable improvement.

In other words, all Christian discernment presupposes an unconditional allegiance to Christian tradition, a basic assumption that this tradition alone is generative of something uniquely and ultimately significant. Note that it is the tradition as such and its generative power that constitute the primary focus of such allegiance. There is still an important place for office-holders and for how they in practice believe that the tradition should be interpreted, but that place is secondary, derivative, and conditional. Clearly, the position I am sketching here stands in sore need of further development, but I hope enough has been said to lend an initial plausibility to two points. Firstly, it is possible to be radically ecclesial without being committed to implausible views regarding the impeccability or infallibility of the Church's office-holders. Perhaps *pace* Ignatius, it is ecclesial solidarity that is essential, not hierarchical obedience. The fact that Teresa is not unlikely ever to be ordained may be simply a matter of her living with the fallible human reality of the contemporary Church, 'for better for worse, for richer for poorer'. It need not automatically be interpreted in terms of divine law. Secondly, it is possible for genuinely Christian pastoral care to be given—including the Exercises—if the parties involved share basic assumptions about the generative power of Christian tradition. The institutional expressions of that power are of secondary importance.

Vocation outside the Church

Where does all this leave us with Martin? As we have seen, if we follow the letter of Ignatius's text, there is but one possible course. Ignatian discernment is appropriate only when there is a question between two or more alternatives sanctioned by the hierarchical Church. What Martin needs is a good dose of sound instruction to bring him to the right path. Common sense and

experience, however, tell us that one does not have to be a Roman Catholic to have a divine vocation at least in some sense, and it is clear that many outside Roman Catholicism are finding the Ignatian process helpful in discovering that vocation. What is the vision of the Church implicit in that fact of lived experience, in the way Martin's case turns out?

The obvious temptation is to abandon any sense whatever that a particular Christian tradition yields privileged access to divine grace. We are all children of God. The limitations of such talk may well not be apparent when, say, Roman Catholics are working with well socialized members of other mainstream Christian Churches—just as the early Jesuits could live with quite naive statements about Church authority. But the limitations are real nevertheless. Sheer common sense tells us that there simply is such a thing as sound doctrine and indeed sound ecclesiology, however hard it is to specify the point further. Thoroughgoing relativism is not an option. Moreover, such doctrine, whatever it is, has implications for our ongoing action. What, then, are the ground rules for Roman Catholics (or, indeed, conservative Evangelicals) working in the ministry of the Exercises with Christians from different traditions?

Paul rebukes the Corinthian community because they are divided into various factions:

> What I mean is that each one of you says, 'I belong to Paul', or 'I belong to Apollos, or 'I belong to Cephas' or 'I belong to Christ'. Is Christ divided? (1 Cor 1,12-13a)

In one sense, the group saying 'I belong to Christ' are right and the others are wrong. After all, it was not Paul who was crucified for them. But the effect of the split—whoever 'started it'—has been to impoverish *everybody's* relationships under God, *everybody's* ecclesial existence, not just those of the party in the wrong. The effect of sin and error is to corrupt the *whole context* within which we respond to grace.

The situation of the Corinthian community can serve as a model for understanding our own dividedness. To say in such a situation 'I belong to Christ' cannot but have a partisan nuance in tension with the statement itself. Statements of sound doctrine will only be properly expressive when unity is restored—or better, achieved. If the relational context is one of division, to say 'I am for Christ'

may in fact be little more than a grotesque triumphalism. If one speaks 'in the tongues of men and of angels', yet without love, then one is only a 'noisy gong or a clanging cymbal' (1 Cor 13,1). And love here means an openness to ongoing self-transformation through encounter with the other. Talk about 'the truth' thus operates on two levels. Doctrinally, some are indeed 'in the right'. The human reality, however, contains no true Church but only a variety of fragmented, imperfect groups. If absolute value remains, it lies within the generative healing *potential* of Christian memory and tradition, a heritage which is not the exclusive property of one faction, but diffused over the whole. And what calls forth our unconditional allegiance is not any one element of our present chaos, but the ultimate catholic unity in diversity which we trust that God will somehow create.

Those, therefore, committed to the view that their own tradition provides a privileged and unique means to God must also be open to the fact that the full meaning of that claim will only be revealed when all Christendom, indeed all creation, is united in God's grace. The differences between Roman Catholicism and Protestantism can be seen not as a matter of black and white, error and truth, but rather as reflecting different shades of grey, different types of ambiguity. Both parties may still sincerely believe at once that what they say is uniquely disclosive of Christian truth, but also that what their statements *do*, the relational reality they continue, remains flawed and fragmentary. This must imply that the Kingdom cannot be built only within the confines of one Christian tradition, however venerable—nor indeed only within the confines of Christianity, though to explore that point goes beyond the scope of the present article.

It follows that even those convinced of the objective superiority of their own tradition must acknowledge that God's grace is at work outside that tradition, and hence that even those who do not accept 'the truth' may still use the pedagogy of the Exercises to grow in response to God's leading. Moreover, the ideal is not to be anticipated. We choose, not the absolute best, but rather one limited option: that which is 'more for the glory and praise of God our Lord and the salvation of my soul' (Exx 179.3). A conviction, therefore, that our own tradition (whatever it be) alone conveys the fullness of truth should not necessarily close us to the possibility that others may be genuinely called by God within a different

tradition. And some may reach the stage where they have to make a genuine discernment as regards their visible ecclesial affiliation.[17]

Towards the end of his life, Karl Rahner imagined Ignatius telling a modern Jesuit how he loved the Church, 'as a sharing in God's inclining to the concrete body of his Son in history'. Wherever people come together in authentic faith, they form a Church, 'a historically tangible, institutional entity'. They sustain this Church, indeed endure it. And this Church is found, for Rahner's Ignatius, 'at its most real (and so hardest and bitterest) for me in the Roman Catholic Church'.[18] Yet surely the concrete body of God's Son is not exclusively the Roman Catholic Church, but rather the broken body of the whole Christian community, and indeed the whole human family, in all its different fragmented institutional forms. And each of us is called to work towards our common wholeness and healing along different paths.

NOTES

[1] Congar, Yves: *L'Église: de Saint Augustin à l'époque moderne* (Paris, 1970), p 369.

[2] For citations from the *Spiritual Exercises*, I use the posthumous Spanish edition by Cándido de Dalmases (Santander, 1987), and make my own translations.

[3] Evans, Linda Mary: 'Catholic and Protestant approaches to the First Week', *The Way Supplement*, 68 (Summer 1990)—hereafter WS 68—pp 5-12, here p 7; Chadwick, Graham: 'Giving the Exercises and training directors in an ecumenical context', WS 68, pp 35-41, here p 37.

[4] Ignatius is both founder of the Jesuits and master of the Exercises. Hence he raises two distinct sets of ecclesiological issues: those implicit in the setting up of a new form of religious life and ministry in the Church, and those arising from his claims regarding the presence of God in the experience of a far wider range of people, if not indeed of all people. I focus here only on the latter set of issues, on 'Ignatian spirituality' rather than 'Jesuit spirituality'. For an authoritative and groundbreaking discussion focusing chiefly on the strictly Jesuit issue, see O'Malley, John W.: 'The fourth vow in its Ignatian context: a historical study', *Studies in the spirituality of Jesuits*, vol 15, no 1, (January, 1983)—an essay to which I am greatly indebted.

[5] MHSJ MI Dir, pp 327-8, fn 207, summarizes the Directory evidence.

[6] Exx 365: *Debemos siempre tener, para en todo acertar, que lo blanco que yo veo creer que es negro, si la Iglesia jerárquica así lo determina; 2creyendo que entre Cristo nuestro Señor, esposo, y la Iglesia, su esposa, es el mismo espíritu que nos gobierna y rige para la salud de nuestras ánimas, 3porque por el mismo Espíritu y señor nuestro que dio los diez mandamientos es regida y governada nuestra santa madre Iglesia.*

The syntax of the key first versicle is not clear, and the interpretation hence perhaps debatable.

[7] Compare the statement of Erasmus to which Ignatius may be alluding: 'For neither would black be white simply because the Roman Pontiff so pronounced—which I know he will never do'. See O'Malley, 'Fourth Vow', pp 14-15, for a judicious discussion.

[8] Schwager, Raymund: *Das dramatische Kirchenverständnis bei Ignatius von Loyola* (Zurich, 1970), p 152. One of Schwager's key claims is that Ignatius's approach might best be described

as 'dramatic'. Though the rhetoric needs to be unpacked, Schwager's conclusion is worth quoting: 'This term would suitably express how true union with the Church is something to be sought by working through all the prejudices, affective limitations and sinfulness of individual Christians and of the representatives of the Church. It would become clear that union with the Church takes place in human encounter—encounter with human beings among whom something like the various phases of a drama can be played out and indeed must be played out: development, conflict, tension, crisis, catastrophe, and final reconciliation and denouement. Ignatius's actual experience of the Church thus seems best interpreted as an encouragement to take part in this drama. And this drama is certainly no tragedy, but rather something enlivened by the sure hope of a final reconciliation. However, where people lack the courage to play out the drama and seek the denouement prematurely, then it is probably no longer the all-embracing Spirit that is at work. Rather an idolatrous tendency is manifesting itself, whereby people are tempted to absolutize visible structures' (pp 186-7).

For documentation in English on the various attempts in Ignatius's lifetime to make Jesuits bishops, see Espinosa Pólit, Manual: *Perfect obedience* (Westminster Md., 1947), pp 191-205. For reactions to Schwager arguing for a greater consistency between Ignatius's words and actions, see two review articles in *Manresa*, 43 (1971)—Iparraguirre, Ignacio: '¿Réquiem para los Ejercicios ignacianos?', pp 245-254, especially the final pages; and Granero, Jesús M.: 'San Ignacio y su posición ante la Iglesia', pp 303-320. Readers of German may wish to supplement Schwager's study with Schneider, Burkhart: 'Die Kirchlichkeit des heiligen Ignatius von Loyola', in *Sentire Ecclesiam*, edited by Jean Daniélou and Herbert Vorgrimler (Freiburg, 1961), pp 268-300.

[9] MHSJ *FN* I, pp 6-14, especially pp 10-11; Rahner, Hugo: *Saint Ignatius Loyola: letters to women* (Edinburgh, 1960), pp 268-274, especially pp 271-272.

[10] Exx 22: *Para que así el que da los ejercicios espirituales, como el que los recibe, más se ayuden y se aprovechen, 2se ha de presuponer que todo buen cristiano ha de ser más pronto a salvar la proposición del prójimo que a condenarla; 3y si no la puede salvar, inquira cómo la entiende; 4y, si no basta, busque todos los medios convenientes para que, bien entendiéndola, se salve.*

A number of translational points here are difficult. In particular, it is unclear whether the subject of the final verb is the *proposición* or the other person. See Dalmases's footnote in his edition, p 53.

[11] Shakespeare, William: *Romeo and Juliet*, II i—'But soft, what light through yonder window breaks?/It is the east, and Juliet is the sun'.

[12] Dalmases, Cándido de: *Ignatius of Loyola: founder of the Jesuits*, (St Louis, 1985), pp 190-201; more fully in 'S.Ignacio de Loyola y la contrareforma', *Studia missionalia*, vol 34 (1985), pp 321-50, especially pp 340ff; O'Malley, 'Fourth Vow', pp 8-21; 'Attitudes of the early Jesuits towards misbelievers', WS 68, pp 62-73. Dalmases brings out a significant contrast between Ignatius's instructions to those attempting ministry among Protestants with the much more authoritarian line he took when writing to civil rulers of areas where schism had either occurred or was threatening.

[13] *Obras completas de San Ignacio de Loyola*, fourth edition, edited by Ignacio Iparraguirre and Cándido de Dalmases (Madrid, 1982), p 753; *Letters of St Ignatius of Loyola*, selected and translated by William J. Young (Chicago, 1959), p 181.

[14] *Obras completas*, p 827; *Letters of St Ignatius*, p 258.

[15] Much is often made of speculations by Nadal that the Exercises can be given to Lutherans, infidels and heretics (MHSJ MN IV, pp 848-52; *Orationis observationes*, p 100). It needs to be remembered, firstly, that these passages are isolated and nuanced, and there is certainly no question of Nadal relativizing what he sees as the unquestionable superiority of the Roman Catholic tradition. Secondly, there is no evidence that Nadal's speculations were ever systematically put into practice. Iparraguirre's painstaking history of the practice of the Exercises gives only two primary texts referring to 'heretics' making the Exercises, and in both cases the context is one of a return to the true fold of Catholicism. (Iparraguirre,

Ignacio: *Práctica de los Ejercicios de San Ignacio de Loyola en vida de su autor [1522–1526]* [Bilbao and Rome, 1946], p 136; MHSJ MF, p 153; Pol Chron, pp 102–3.)

[16] For further explorations of the point, see, for example, Lindbeck, George A: *The nature of doctrine* (Philadelphia, 1984); Kerr, Fergus: *Theology after Wittgenstein* (Oxford, 1986).

[17] See Cornwell, Peter: 'A personal journey', *WS* 68, pp 42–51, especially p 49.

[18] Rahner, Karl: 'Ignatius of Loyola speaks to a modern Jesuit', in *Ignatius of Loyola* (London, 1979), pp 11–38, here p 27 (translation corrected—*im Mitvollzug der Neigung Gottes zum konkreten Leib seines Sohnes in der Geschichte*), p 38.