

The fellowship of life

Albert Schweitzer and the moral status of animals

Ara Barsam

As the housekeeper who has scrubbed the floor sees to it that the door is shut, so that the dog does not come in and undo all the work with his muddy paws, so religious and philosophical thinkers have gone to great pains to see that no animals enter and upset their system of ethics.¹

ALBERT SCHWEITZER (1875–1965) WAS A POLYMATHIC figure: biblical scholar, musician, physician, preacher, philosopher, and theologian. He is chiefly remembered in theological circles for *The quest of the historical Jesus*, or more broadly for his medical mission in Africa or his interpretations of J. S. Bach's music. But Schweitzer considered his most meaningful contribution, the one for which he most wished to be remembered, to be his ethic of 'reverence for life'.

Although the concept of 'reverence for life' is well known, it has been subject to a range of distortions and it is important that we confront these in order to understand what Schweitzer meant by this term.² We will then be in a better position to examine some of the ways in which his ethical thought may be instructive for theological discussions on the moral status of animals.

An 'ethical mysticism'

The first distorting lens is *legalism*. Contrary to many commentators, Schweitzer does not propound 'reverence' as a new moral law but rather as 'ethical mysticism'. His ethical mysticism emerges from reflection upon the key concept 'will-to-live'. 'The essential thing to realise about ethics is that it is the very manifestation of our will-to-live.'³

Schweitzer's specific use of the term 'will-to-live' is derived (not without modification) from Arthur Schopenhauer.⁴ He lauds Schopenhauer's conviction that 'the essence of things-in-themselves,

which is to be accepted as underlying all phenomena, is the will-to-live.⁵ Schweitzer agrees that the 'will-to-live' is not something secondary (i.e. a consequence of the knowledge of life) but rather is primary, immediate and unconditioned.⁶ Since the basis of one's self is experienced as will-to-live, he believes the basis of all animate phenomena in the world, by 'analogy' with himself, similarly to be will-to-live.⁷ Schweitzer is concerned then with the claim that an understanding of human nature is simultaneously an insight more generally into the nature of reality. From a comprehension of oneself (the microcosm), one is able to acquire knowledge of the world (the macrocosm); the key to understanding the world is proper self-understanding. Schweitzer's metaphysics begin with the supposition that, despite the diversity and multiplicity of individual things in the world, all manifest the same inner essence, a will-to-live.

Schweitzer's argument rests largely on the question of whether knowledge from the inner experience of the will-to-live is more reliable than knowledge derived from empirical examination of the outer, physical world. His thought is that all reality must, like himself, have an inner nature (will-to-live) and he uses this notion to offer a new account of the relationship between the self, other life and God. The non-empirical quality of the will as the core self is a presupposition of his work, although often formulated as if it were a report of an established fact.

It is from reflection on the will-to-live that Schweitzer derives the ethic of reverence for life. Ethical mysticism begins with a personal reflection on the self in the finite world that binds humans with non-human life and God (often referred to as the 'infinite Will-to-Live'). For Schweitzer, 'the most immediate and comprehensive fact of consciousness is that "I am life which wills to live, in the midst of life which wills to live."' ⁸ The direct, experiential identification of one's individual will-to-live (life) with other life, and through life with God, is foundational to Schweitzer's ethical mysticism. Though his mysticism starts from the individual subject ('I am life which wills-to-live'), it extends to a generalization on the world ('in the midst of other wills-to-live'). He does not limit the will-to-live to humans; it is discernible in 'the flowering tree, in strange forms of medusa, [and] in the blade of grass'.⁹ Concretely: 'Everything, accordingly, which meets me in the world of phenomena is a manifestation of the will-to-live.'¹⁰ Lastly and crucially, Schweitzer returns to the finite manifestations of life and holds that human moral action is the locus of mystical relation: 'in

loving self-devotion to other life we realise our spiritual union with [God].'¹¹

The second distorting lens is *inviolability*. Many commentators have assumed that reverence for life upholds the moral inviolability of all life of whatever kind. It is true that Schweitzer sometimes writes in such a way as to invite this misunderstanding. His basic definition of the moral proclaims: 'it is good to maintain and to encourage life, it is bad to destroy life or obstruct it.'¹² Further, the ethical person is one who:

. . . tears no leaf from a tree, plucks no flower, and takes care to crush no insect. If in the summer he is working by lamplight, he prefers to keep the window shut and breathe a stuffy atmosphere rather than see one insect after another fall with singed wings upon his table.

If he walks on the road after a shower and sees an earthworm which has strayed on to it, he bethinks himself that it must get dried up in the sun, if it does not return soon enough to ground into which it can burrow, so he lifts it from the dead stone surface, and puts it on grass. If he comes across an insect which has fallen into a puddle, he stops a moment in order to hold out a leaf or a stalk on which it can save itself.¹³

At first sight the sheer practical impossibility of these injunctions presents itself. But what Schweitzer offers here are not *rules* but rather *examples* of the type of action expected from one who upholds reverence for life. Although he upholds the boundless demands of reverence for life, he acknowledges that in order to maintain life, humans are forced to harm or sacrifice other wills-to-live. Indeed, the very word 'reverence' (*Ehrfurcht*) indicates that he is not depicting obedience to moral law but is concerned with 'a new temper of mind'.¹⁴ *Ehrfurcht* is an ideal of character towards other life which 'penetrates unceasingly and in all directions a man's observation, reflection, and resolutions'.¹⁵

Reverence for life cannot be described in detail once and for all. Neither can it be expressed in convenient formulae nor reduced to a list of imperatives. Schweitzer is hesitant to codify ethical options in advance and can often be seen to provide less an 'ethic' or principle than an 'ethos' in the sense of a preparation of attitudes prior to the decision of moral action.

The third distorting lens is *inconsistency*. Since Schweitzer defines reverence as an 'absolute' ethic which enjoins 'responsibility without limit towards all that lives',¹⁶ it is perhaps not surprising that reverence is judged to entail inconsistency in practice. Indeed, Schweitzer is not

immune from such charges since, for example, he notoriously had fish caught to feed his sick pelicans. Such inconsistencies are made more glaring in the light of his rejection of any moral hierarchy.

The ethics of reverence for life makes no distinction between higher and lower, more precious and less precious lives. It has good reasons for this omission. For what are we doing, when we establish hard and fast gradations in value between living organisms, but judging them in relation to ourselves, by whether they seem to stand closer to us or farther from us? This is a wholly subjective standard. How can we know the importance other living organisms have in themselves and in terms of the universe?¹⁷

Schweitzer is often interpreted at this point as suggesting that no form of life should ever be destroyed and that all creatures, humans to microbes, should have the same moral worth. It is doubtful whether this was his intention. Rather what he is doing here is rejecting the long tradition of moral hierarchy which places humanity at the top of the pyramid of descending moral worth. Schweitzer readily and regrettably admitted that it is sometimes necessary to make choices between various forms of life. But what he wanted to emphasize was the essentially *subjective* and *arbitrary* nature of these declarations. Though in practical matters humans must make decisions about the relative priority of diverse life forms, our judgement in this matter is irreducibly subjective (anthropocentric) and not to be taken as an objective measure of the value of other life forms.

Shared source in God

For Schweitzer, the presence of the will-to-live affords a being its intrinsic worth. But the will-to-live itself is not seen as the direct *source* of its value. The origin of value lies in the infinite Will-to-Live, God; through the will-to-live 'my existence joins in pursuing the aims of the infinite Will-to-Live of which I am a manifestation . . . and thus I give my existence a meaning from within outwards'.¹⁸ Value comes not from human estimation, but from the view that the human will-to-live (and *all* wills-to-live) are of a shared source in God.

The common origin of all wills-to-live is a doctrine which carries with it epistemological and ethical implications for Schweitzer. He affirms that 'life' is 'something possessing value *in itself*',¹⁹ and believes 'the mystery of life is always too profound for us, and its value is beyond our capacity to estimate'.²⁰ The experience, or apprehension, of moral value is primary.

Reverence for life then is neither a moral principle that upholds the absolute inviolability of life nor a strict set of obligations to be construed as moral law. 'Ehrfurcht' holds a vaster connotation; it is attitude, experience and mysticism. Indeed, shorn of its mystical aspect, Schweitzer's thought *does* look absolutist and impracticable. But that is precisely how he wished *not* to be read. Schweitzer suggests that there are other values of deeper import than the strict preservation of life. For instance, 'prolonged' and 'intense' suffering is 'a more terrible lord of mankind than even death'.²¹ This important point is made with particular emphasis and deserves to be read in full:

However seriously man undertakes to abstain from killing and damaging, he cannot entirely avoid it. He is under the law of necessity, which compels him to kill and to damage both with and without his knowledge. In many ways it may happen that by slavish adherence to the commandment not to kill compassion is less served than by breaking it. When the suffering of a living creature cannot be alleviated, it is more ethical to end its life by killing it mercifully than it is to stand aloof. It is more cruel to let domestic animals which one can no longer feed die a painful death by starvation than to give them a quick and painless end. The principle of not-killing and not-harming must not aim at being independent, *but must be the servant of, and subordinate itself to, compassion.*²²

Active compassion supersedes even strict observance of the principle of non-violence. While no killing can be seen as a moral good, it may sometimes be considered 'justifiable' in situations of crisis where competing claims conflict. The injury or destruction of any creature requires moral justification, though even such justification does not make killing ethical. To keep 'adjustments between ethics and necessity all ready for use' in order to ease one's conscience is unethical. Responsible action means the abandonment of any claim to ethical righteousness: 'The good conscience,' Schweitzer never ceases to remind us, 'is an invention of the devil.'²³

Reverence for life, far from a more literal interpretation of the phrase, is not meant to establish specific rules for each possible circumstance, but to create an attitude of universal reverence that motivates action.

Challenges to Christian theology and ethics

Having clarified aspects of Schweitzer's reverence for life, it is now possible to indicate some of his challenges to contemporary Christian theological discussions on the moral status of animals.

The first and perhaps most important contribution that Schweitzer presents concerns *the mystical apprehension of the value of life*. At the centre of many present theological controversies is the issue of value: whether beings outside of ourselves hold value, and if so, of what kind and why. What Schweitzer emphasizes is that the recognition and appreciation of the value of life is a mystical apprehension. This understanding is 'primary' because all subsequent decisions and choices depend upon it.

To understand Schweitzer at this point it is perhaps best to recall Plato who describes philosophers in a democratic state as those who 'wrangle over notions of right in the minds of men who have never beheld Justice itself'.²⁴ Likewise, Schweitzer would maintain that one can have no proper sense of oneself or other beings in the world unless, first and foremost, one has a sufficient sense of the value of *life* itself. Everything depends practically upon this prior recognition of value. In order to appreciate more fully Schweitzer's insight, it may be instructive to contrast his position with instrumentalist and utilitarian considerations of value as expounded by thinkers within the Christian tradition.

As we have seen, Schweitzer refuses to add subjective value-judgements – such as this is valuable, this is expendable – to any manifestation of life. Each manifestation of the will-to-live is to be seen in and for itself, and separate from anthropocentric representations. By contrast, many prominent Christian theologians have offered an instrumentalist understanding of life. Entrenched in a theological tradition of the orders of creation, St Augustine states in relation to the Old Testament prohibition against killing:

When we say, 'Thou shalt not kill,' we do not understand this . . . of the irrational animals that fly, swim, walk, or creep, since they are disassociated from us by their want of reason, and are therefore by the just appointment of the Creator subjected to us to kill or keep alive for our own uses; if so, then it remains that we understand the commandment simply of man.²⁵

Augustine's rejection of fellowship with animals is not alone in the Christian tradition. St Thomas Aquinas also feels that '[d]umb animals and plants are devoid of the life of reason' which is 'a sign that they are naturally enslaved and accommodated to the uses of others [i.e. humans]'.²⁶ He continues to expound an instrumentalist and hierarchical understanding of creation.

Hereby is refuted the error of those who said it is sinful for a man to kill dumb animals: for by divine providence they are intended for man's use in the natural order. Hence it is not wrong for man to make use of them, either by killing or in any way whatever.²⁷

Aquinas understands the role of non-human creation almost strictly in terms of its capacity to serve human wants. Creation, he insists, was created solely for 'intellectual creatures'. In Augustine's and Aquinas's theology, the value of non-human life is measured by its utility to human interests. Since animals are seen to lack 'rationality', they can then be considered as instruments for humans who alone possess such a capacity. Rationality is regarded as the faculty *par excellence* which determines our immortal soulfulness, a trait explicitly denied to non-human creation.

A similar type of instrumentalism is found in the Reformers, notably John Calvin and Martin Luther. Addressing the issue of the subjection of animals to human dominion in Genesis 1, Calvin remarks: 'Hence we infer what was the end for which all things were created; namely, that none of the conveniences and necessities of life might be wanting to men'.²⁸ Calvin believes 'that men may render animals subservient to their own convenience, and may apply them to various uses, according to their wishes and their necessities'.²⁹ Luther follows suit. After the fall and flood, 'the animals are subjected to man as to a tyrant who has absolute power over life and death'.³⁰ For Luther, this is God's 'gift' to humans and it shows how God is 'favourably inclined and friendly towards man'.³¹

The inherent value of animal life

These thinkers and two traditions, as with most modern theology, unite in seeing animals as a utility device for the fulfilment of human aims. Such understandings of non-rationality and non-fellowship have largely dominated Christian discussions of animals and have served as the justification for excluding them from moral consideration. In contrast, Schweitzer locates the value of beings not in any specific faculty or capacity limited to a certain species, but rather in the 'will-to-live' common to all life. He presents a rival idea to the scholastic and reformed views: 'life' has inherent worth independent of human calculations. In his sermon on 'Reverence for life' (1918), Schweitzer begins with a sweeping refutation of traditional Christian conceptions of humans' behaviour towards non-human life: 'Christianity, from the

first centuries up until deep in the Middle Ages, did not ennoble people in their behaviour toward animals. Throughout the centuries one finds the greatest thoughtlessness and crudeness bound together with the most earnest piety.³² His sermon continues with an attack on the theological rationale for neglect of non-human creatures.

One thinks less about what we ought to be toward the poor creatures than again and again about how *one can make the most of the difference between man and them*: 'You have an immortal soul. The animal does not. An unbridgeable chasm lies between us,' as if we really knew something about it.³³

The emphasis – promulgated by Aquinas, Augustine, Calvin and Luther, amongst others – placed on the *differences* between humans and other life forms has, Schweitzer claims, obscured humans' moral responsibility to reverence animal life. Instead of focusing on the 'differences' amongst various forms of life, Schweitzer maintains that humans should seek to 'experience the inner-relatedness that exists among all living things'.³⁴ A utilitarian perspective on the world, he suggests, conceals from us our relation with it. As such, Schweitzer defines the human person (i.e. as life in the midst of life) in terms of relationality, not juxtaposition, to other life. Self-consciousness goes hand in hand with moral consciousness. From such an ontology of sociality, he emphasizes that the 'dissimilarity, the strangeness, between us and other creatures is here removed', and he enjoins humans to hold a 'reverence for all life'.³⁵

The mystical apprehension of the value of life, or 'will-to-live' as Schweitzer would say, becomes the central linking concept of ontological continuity amongst humans, non-human species and God. It is this sense of connection, not 'difference' or 'utility', which Schweitzer challenges us to find with other creatures: one's attitude to 'life' is the touchstone of Christian ethics. Such a view affirms the value of all life and incorporates consideration of non-human species in theological discourse: 'To think out in every implication the ethic of love for all creation – this is the difficult task which confronts our age.'³⁶ To take seriously a theocentric ethical view of creation is to affirm that all life holds value to the Creator and merits reverence: 'We reject the idea that man is "master of other creatures," "lord" above all others. We no longer say there are senseless existences with which we can deal as we please.'³⁷ Schweitzer suggests a transformation of our relationship to

the universe: we are to perceive each manifestation of life for *itself*, and no longer for *ourselves*.

Schweitzer's view challenges the idea that humans' sole responsibility in the world is to take care of their own species. Ethical concern for human life is seen to be part of a wider moral horizon that encompasses all life. In his exegesis of the parable of the Good Samaritan, Schweitzer seeks to expand our understanding of neighbour to include non-human creation.

What is the sort of love toward God which compels us to be kind to others? What does love for our neighbour mean? . . . The presupposition of morality is to share everything that goes on around us, not only in human life but also in the life of all creatures.³⁸

By extending the category of 'neighbour' to include all life, Schweitzer's reading of the parable develops Jesus' refusal to limit the extent of neighbourly love. Schweitzer rejects the same limiting question that the lawyer asked Jesus; rather than narrowing the scope of 'neighbour', he recasts the issue.

Schweitzer includes non-human life in the category of neighbour. He rejects attempts to circumscribe the boundaries of moral concern: reverence for life 'does not draw a circle of well-defined tasks around me, but charges each individual with responsibility for all life within his reach and forces him to devote himself to helping that life'.³⁹ He reads the parable as a metaphor for moral inclusivity that corresponds analogically to non-human species. Like Jesus' rejection of a racially restrictive criterion of neighbourly discrimination, Schweitzer seeks to counter the limiting structures of communal proximity by emphasizing humans' participation in the 'community of life'.

Practical implications

As Schweitzer's convictions deepened, some of the practical implications of his thinking began to catch up with him. One change was his adoption of a vegetarian diet later in life. Erica Anderson, his photographer narrates:

No bird or animal in the hospital village – hen or pig or sheep – is killed for food. Fish and crocodile meat brought by fishermen are occasionally served at table, but Schweitzer himself in recent years has given up eating either meat or fish, even the liver dumplings he used to relish and enjoy.

'I can't eat anything that was alive any more' [Schweitzer said]. When a man questioned him on his philosophy and said that God made fish and fowl for people to eat, he answered, 'Not at all.'⁴⁰

During Schweitzer's final illness, his daughter, Rhena, offered him beef broth. He declined.

He challenges us to see that our moral community is not simply composed of humans: "What you have done to one of the least of these, you have done to me." This word of Jesus is valid for us all, and it ought to determine what we do also to the least among living creatures.⁴¹ The Samaritan is a paradigm of love that shatters conventional responsibility and thus for Schweitzer *creates* a new set of neighbour relations where previously there were none. And certainly for him, the concluding words of the parable stand as a challenge to Christian ethics: 'Go and do likewise.'

The way Schweitzer's insight can contribute to Christian ethics is the directing of *moral sensitivity to suffering life*. He repeatedly draws attention to 'the cry of the Fellowship of those who bear the Mark of Pain'. Who are the members of this Fellowship? 'Those who have learnt by experience what physical pain and bodily anguish mean, belong together all the world over; they are united by a secret bond.'⁴²

The Fellowship of Pain certainly included the human community. But it also extended beyond humankind. In a passage from his autobiography, he speaks again of his sensitivity to the prevalence of suffering and the costly, sacrificial kind of loving it engenders.

Only at rare moments have I felt really glad to be alive. I cannot help but feel the suffering all around me, not only of humanity but of the whole of creation. I have never tried to withdraw myself from this community of suffering. It seemed to me a matter of course that we should all take our share of the burden of pain that lies upon the world.⁴³

While Schweitzer believed suffering was ineluctably a feature of his life, he never allowed it sovereignty over his own existence. The implication he draws from this insight is that human responsibility in the world involves seeking to release others from suffering. Schweitzer's especial emphasis on the debilitating nature of pain that exists in both the human and non-human world focuses attention on the problem of redemption.

And we all, when we see suffering, must be challenged by a desire for redemption, to help all creatures. We move within the midst of a great mystery: the mystery of pain. And we come to be always conscious of our great responsibility to alleviate it.⁴⁴

Sensitivity to the suffering in the world requires humans not only to renounce violence against life (insofar as it is possible to do so) but also to alleviate it. This involves a costly self-sacrifice on behalf of others and finds expression for Schweitzer in reverence for life. Perhaps more than any other theologian, he connects the suffering in the world with service to other life. But the problem of suffering is not resolved in this world. As explored below, Schweitzer's next insight on the Fellowship of Pain relates to an eschatological hope for the redemption of creaturely suffering.

Perhaps it is appropriate to address Schweitzer's eschatological challenge 'at the end'. Schweitzer can contribute to contemporary theological ethics by offering an *eschatology of liberation*, a universal redemption of all beings from the bondage of suffering and death.

For Schweitzer, the eschatological field has been a playground for anthropocentrism.

Originally the dominant thought of the Kingdom of God meant that believers shared with one another the blessings of a new creation. But now the experience of the individual took precedence . . . Each separate believer is now concerned with his own redemption. He cares nothing for the future of mankind and of the world.⁴⁵

By contrast, Schweitzer's vision of redemption is as comprehensive as creation itself. His eschatology of liberation draws on both Old and New Testament visions of universal redemption. His perception of the kingdom of God stems from his reading of 'the prophet Isaiah' (11:6–9) who proclaims 'the Lord will save the world', as well as St Paul's 'marvellous passage' (i.e. Romans 8:22) that 'speaks of the longing of the whole creation for early redemption' and displays 'his deep sympathy with the animal creation and the natural world'.⁴⁶ Schweitzer writes of the cosmic scope of Christian eschatology, highlighting the import of God's future as one not merely for humans but for the whole creation which groans and sighs. As with the 'universality' of reverence for life, our conception of the kingdom should be cosmic in scope. Schweitzer challenges us to find a doctrine of human redemption *with* the world, not apart from the world.

Schweitzer and the future of Christian theology

Schweitzer regarded traditional philosophical and religious ethics which restricted their scope to human relations as spiritually impoverished. In its place he offered a new vision: 'We need a boundless ethic which will include the animals also.'⁴⁷ Schweitzer can rightly be seen as a pioneer of an inclusive, non-violent ethic and prophetic of contemporary concerns in animal theology.

Schweitzer's thought challenges Christian theology's constricted ethical conceptions of life and offers some insights on how they might be enlarged. His continuing challenge to Christian theology remains to implement such ethical insights today. In that sense, Schweitzer's contribution to Christian ethics is in many ways only now beginning.

Ara Barsam is a doctoral student at the University of Oxford where he is working on Albert Schweitzer's mystical theology and ethics, and serves as a tutor for the Study of Religion.

NOTES

1 Albert Schweitzer, *The teaching of reverence for life*, Richard and Clara Winston (trans) (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965), p 49.

2 For treatment of this topic with regard to its ecological-theological significance, see Ara Barsam and Andrew Linzey, 'Albert Schweitzer' in Joy Palmer (ed), *Fifty key thinkers on the environment* (London: Routledge Press, 2000).

3 Albert Schweitzer, 'The ethics of reverence for life', *Christendom* (Winter 1936), p 229.

4 Kant maintained that the differentiation between noumenal and phenomenal worlds delineated the absolute border of knowledge. But it is of great importance for Schopenhauer to claim that we are aware of ourselves in two distinct ways: in the cognitive fashion through which we come to know external things, and 'from within' which may be described as 'will'. He writes: 'The will is that primary and original force . . . and expresses in itself in some way every thing in the world and is the kernel of all phenomena.' After asserting the primacy of the will, Schopenhauer refines the concept, describing it as 'will-to-live': 'Every glance of the world . . . confirms and establishes that the will-to-live, far from being an arbitrary hypostasis, is the only true description of the world's innermost nature.' Arthur Schopenhauer, *The world as will and representation*, E. F. J. Payne (trans) (New York: Dover, 1966), pp 293, 350.

5 Albert Schweitzer, *The philosophy of civilisation*, C. T. Campion (trans) (New York: Macmillan and Company, 1950), p 236. Schopenhauer repeatedly affirms that the thing-in-itself is the 'will-to-live'. See *The world as will and representation*, pp 14, 16, 18, *et passim*.

6 Schweitzer, *The philosophy of civilisation*, p 55. 'Das Letzte Wissen, nach dem wir trachten, ist das Wissen vom Leben. Unser Erkennen erschaut das Leben von au'en, unser Wille von innen.'

7 *Ibid.*, p 308.

8 *Ibid.*, p 310.

9 *Ibid.*, p 282.

10 *Ibid.*, p 237.

- 11 Albert Schweitzer, *Indian thought and its development*, C. B. E. Russell (trans) (Boston: Beacon Press, 1936), p 264.
- 12 *The philosophy of civilisation*, p 309.
- 13 *Ibid.*, p 310.
- 14 *Ibid.*, p 83.
- 15 *Ibid.*, p 316.
- 16 *Ibid.*, p 311.
- 17 *The teaching of reverence for life*, p 47.
- 18 *The philosophy of civilisation*, p 305.
- 19 *Ibid.*, p 57.
- 20 'The ethics of reverence for life', p 238.
- 21 Albert Schweitzer, *On the edge of the primeval forest*, C. T. Campion (trans) (London: A. & C. Black, 1922), p 70.
- 22 *Indian thought and its development*, p 83.
- 23 *The philosophy of civilisation*, p 318.
- 24 Plato, *The republic* Part VII, 518, F. M. Cornford (trans) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), p 232.
- 25 St Augustine, *The city of God* I.20, Marcus Dods (trans) (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1877), p 32.
- 26 St Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* Ia 64.1.
- 27 St Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles* III.12.
- 28 John Calvin, *Commentaries on the first book of Moses called Genesis* vol I (1:26), John King (trans) (Edinburgh: Edinburgh Printing Company, 1847), p 96.
- 29 Calvin, *Commentaries on the first book of Moses called Genesis* vol I (9:2), p 291.
- 30 Martin Luther, in *Luther's works* vol II, Jaroslav Pelikan (ed) (St Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1958), p 132.
- 31 Luther, in *Luther's works* vol II, p 133.
- 32 Albert Schweitzer, *A place for revelation: sermons on reverence for life*, Martin Strege and Lothar Stiehm (eds), David Larrimore Holland (trans) (New York: Macmillan Press, 1988), p 24.
- 33 *Ibid.*, p 24.
- 34 *Ibid.*, p 24.
- 35 *Ibid.*, p 11.
- 36 Albert Schweitzer, 'Philosophy and the movement for the protection of animals', *The International Journal of Animal Protection* (May 1935).
- 37 Albert Schweitzer, in Erica Anderson, *The Schweitzer album* (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), p 174.
- 38 Albert Schweitzer, in *Reverence for life*, Ulrich Neuenschwander (ed), Reginald H. Fuller (trans) (New York: Harper & Row, 1969), pp 118-119.
- 39 Albert Schweitzer, *Out of my life and thought*, A. B. Lemke (trans) (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1990), p 237.
- 40 Anderson, *The Schweitzer album*, p 37.
- 41 *A place for revelation: sermons on reverence for life*, p 32.
- 42 *On the edge of the primeval forest*, pp 124-25.
- 43 *Out of my life and thought*, p 242.
- 44 Schweitzer, in Anderson, *The Schweitzer album*, p 162.
- 45 Albert Schweitzer, in E. N. Mozley (ed), *The theology of Albert Schweitzer for Christian enquirers* (London: A. & C. Black, 1950), p 83.
- 46 *A place for revelation: sermons on reverence for life*, p 32.
- 47 Albert Schweitzer, in Charles Joy (ed), *The animal world of Albert Schweitzer: jungle insights into reverence for life* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1950), p 30.