BEYOND THE COLD WAR

By RONALD A. MERCIER

WHAT A DIFFERENCE SIX YEARS MAKE! It seems but a short time since the heady days following the collapse of the Iron Curtain. Reflection on those moments brimmed over with a profound, and some would say naïve, optimism. Pope John Paul in particular reflected on the hand of divine providence present in so remarkable a train of events.

> Undoubtedly, the struggle which led to the changes of 1989 called for clarity, moderation, suffering and sacrifice. In a certain sense, it was a struggle born of prayer, and it would have been unthinkable without immense trust in God, the Lord of history, who carries the human heart in his hands. It is by uniting his own sufferings for the sake of truth and freedom to the sufferings of Christ on the Cross that man is able to accomplish the miracle of peace and is in a position to discern the often narrow path between the cowardice which gives in to evil and the violence which, under the illusion of fighting evil, only makes it worse.[1]

Such profound optimism, which foresaw an extraordinary possibility of creating a world of peace, marked the thoughts of many. The sense of the world uniting in the Gulf War bore similar millennial hopes for a 'new world order'.

What has happened along the way? How has the bright promise of the end of the cold war now given rise to the nostalgic desire for a return to better days? In the discussions which mark the anguish over the appropriate response to the terrible carnage in the former Yugoslavia, that sense of the cold war as a 'golden era' which held in check baser human instincts has emerged as a recurring theme. Is this a case of simple horror over present events, or might not there be a deeper issue involved here, one which touches on how we perceive ourselves and our communities as finally fragile and fearful?

From the standpoint of contemporary debates in ethics, a foundational issue does emerge: the ambiguous reality of evil in our lives and in our history. Paradoxically, the origins and stability of the period we know as the cold war represent both a response to and a flight from the disturbing choices which faced many societies in the turbulent middle

decades of this century. Ironically, the ability to have and to domesticate the demonic opponent provided a safe venue for pursuing national interests.

We must note how the 'demonic' functions here: namely as the very presence or embodiment of evil, the cosmic threat to the existence of the person, of the nation, or indeed of the world. This is not the *daimon* of the Hellenistic tradition, but rather the antithesis of God or of the good. The ability to identify oneself with the good and 'the other' with evil in its pure form constitutes a hallmark of the cold war, of ideological war. It forms a cornerstone for the moral structure of such an opposition.[2]

Such an ability to create absolute opposition had significant repercussions for policy-making during the cold war. Attention to the 'demonic other' blinded many to deeper and more troubling reflection upon moral problems closer to home. The present search for some foe to fear, whether in fundamentalist Islam or in 'the new world order' as among the fringe militias in the United States or 'liberal orthodoxy', provides a useful escape from the need to remember, to reflect, and to discern.[3]

The origins of the cold war

The trouble with myths is that they have so many aspects and no certain parentage. They arise out of history almost naturally, seemingly the product of inevitable forces. The cold war with its enduring form and subtle dynamics provides a case in point. It provided no less than a stable frame of reference for all debates for over almost a half century.

Given this mythic quality, it comes as no surprise that one can find a plethora of interpretations of the rise of this confrontation. Many of the interpretations reveal as much about the author as about the situation itself. The critical intersection of a number of important events which made possible, though not inevitable, the bloc mentality, forms the basic concern here. Without seeing the cold war as inevitable, the many forces which emerged, or re-emerged, in the wake of World War II provided a necessary precondition for what came to pass.

Here I would make one point forcefully. The temptation can arise of attributing the demonization which occurred simply to various misunderstandings by one side or the other, beginning from the time when the defeat of Germany became a foregone conclusion. Similarly, the battle of 'ideologies' provides a ready explanation for so enduring a battle. The attention on the issue of otherness, however, prevents a much needed attentiveness to what gave rise to the possibility of such

misunderstandings and points away from any possible parallels in our own time. Paying attention to such considerations reveals a curious irony, perhaps one rooted precisely in the complexities of modernization itself. The essential tensions in both superpowers mirror each other in ways which made demonization of 'the other' inevitable.

On the surface, a comparison of the United States and the Soviet Union on VJ Day seems to belie possible points of contact. The United States, which had escaped the firestorm of the war, stood as a giant among the nations of the world. Its industrial capacity could only evoke wonder. Its agricultural sector had never seen years as prosperous or as productive. Its armed forces, equipped with nuclear as well as conventional weapons, provoked legitimate fear on the part of any adversary. The national sense of purpose which had enabled the nation to bear burdens during the war spoke to a solid political and social foundation. In many ways, the US stood as an object of envy for many.

By comparison, the USSR, so strong militarily, was a crippled giant at best. Its most productive agricultural areas, already devastated by the purges of the 1930s, lay fallow under the double burden of a slash and burn policy by the retreating Soviets in the early part of the war, and the terrible devastation wreaked during the slow reconquest from the Nazi occupation. What had been the industrial heartland of the nation similarly had taken a heavy blow; only the newer industrial areas behind the Urals had been spared. Moreover, for all the unity during the war, the history of the purges was quite recent. Internal politics continued even under the context of totalitarian rule, though the price for a loss of political battles would likely be no less than death. Finally, the Nazi invasion had revealed the extensive discontent with the Soviet system. The partisan war against nationalists in the Baltics and Ukraine continued long after the taking of Berlin.

Clearly the decision-makers in the Kremlin recognized the internal crisis facing them, however heady victory might be. Threats arising from abroad complicated an already dark scene. The USSR clearly had potential, but the post-war USSR seemed destined for a secondary role at best. The decisions facing Stalin and his regime bore a momentous quality.

Beneath the surface, however, a number of parallels emerge, parallels of importance in light of what would come, and especially in light of the decision-making process upon which each nation would have to embark. First and foremost, each nation faced a prospect of massive social and economic dislocation. For the Soviets, this represented an obvious reality in the light of the destruction in the wake of the Stalinist

industrialization and the wartime battles. The economic dislocations were truly enormous.

For the United States, however, the upheaval of national demobilization, both industrial and military, seemed much different. Critically, though, one finds the prospects of 'down-sizing' as daunting as those of rebuilding, if not more so. Despite the efforts of the New Deal and the sense of optimism which the Roosevelt Administration had engendered, the US on the eve of World War II had not recovered significantly from the Great Depression. The able bodies who had been diverted into the military now returned to claim appropriate compensation for their hardships. In the face of a huge debt, however, reabsorbing these numbers would present a great problem. The questions of social justice which had emerged during the Depression and which had provided an 'eschatological' backdrop to the idealism of wartime propaganda returned now. Could the nation make the transition?

Moreover, this took place in the context of the re-emergence of internal divisions within the nation, and indeed within most western societies. Deep debates over the wisdom of involvement in international affairs resurfaced with a vengeance. Budgetary concerns and clashes over the wisdom of New Deal expenditures revealed once more the tenuous quality of national unity. Decision-making would now have to occur within the context of division and retrenchment, which were particularly difficult because they required attention to the foundational values of American society.

To note the tensions within both the US and the USSR is not to establish the kind of 'moral equivalence' so many dread. It is, rather, to pay attention to the critical matrix within which post-war decisions were being made. The ways in which both nations found in their superadversary not merely an enemy but an apocalyptic challenge to their very existence points to commonalities beneath the obvious differences. The commonalities flow, it would seem, directly from the underlying perception of moral vulnerability with respect to critical decisions at hand.

As with the situation of 'demonization' generally, the reality of severe social dislocation requiring critical self-reflection by a nation or state provides the necessary precondition for such an 'apocalyptic' concern. One can observe parallels in outbreaks of anti-Semitism, wherever or whenever they occurred, or in the terrible cataclysm in the former Yugoslavia. As awful as the apocalyptic combat may be, the alternative attention to serious underlying socio-political decisions appears the more challenging.

In a sense, then, while the murderous overtone of 'demonization' emerges very obviously, as in Bosnia, a curious undertone also stands revealed. The presence of a 'demon', preferably of great power, provides a strangely quieting effect, allowing one to turn away from more existential crises. Even given the terrible possibilities, such as those of the Cuban missile crisis, the underlying assumption of a certain stasis upon which one could rely simplifies the process of decision-making and mutes those internal voices which raise troubling questions. One wishes for a 'devil', but always one with whom one can deal. 'The devil made me do it' covers a multitude of sins, but only as long as the apocalypse is manageable.

The demonic and discernment

Decision-making generally, and particularly so on the national level, operates on two very different levels. The difference between them provides a crucial point of reflection. On the one hand, times of plenty or growth see decisions made as if by habit, following a 'normative pattern' rooted in a clear sense of national identity. At times of stress, such habits, however deeply ingrained they might be, undergo profound dislocation. Decisions require self-critique, which is perhaps the most difficult aspect of discernment, whether personal or communal.

Normally, the pattern of political decision arises out of a habitual disposition. This 'corporate identity' provides the foundation for reflection. The values of a person, an organization or a nation speak clearly of self-perception and a sense of the future which awaits. Success bears a clear meaning in easily perceptible terms. Regardless of the sense we have of corporate decisions as hard-headed exercises of a pragmatic nature, numerous less than pragmatic considerations come into play:

> Values are the bedrock of any corporate culture. As the essence of a company's philosophy for achieving success, values provide a sense of common direction for all employees and guidelines for their day-to-day behavior. These formulas for success determine (and occasionally arise from) the types of corporate heroes, and the myths, rituals, and ceremonies of the culture. In fact, we think that often companies succeed because their employees can identify, embrace, and act on the values of the organization.[4]

Ironically, precisely the most result-oriented organizations operate quite deliberately from a 'mythic' basis.

One cannot stress the impact of this structure too highly. Within decision-making structures, a sense of success depends upon a clear

perception of the anticipated future. This arises from mythic and ritual self-perceptions. The future in such a situation presumes a clear result, the growth of the 'corporate body'. Changes then effect not only certain decisions to be reached, but rather the whole identity of the corporation. Only a realization of the underlying structure helps one understand the complexities of corporate decision-making. In a sense, visions of 'the American way of life' or the Stalinist myth of the *homo sovieticus* presumed certain almost automatic choices for those in authority.

Ironically, clear goals or challenges provide perfect nourishment for such automatic decision-making. The need to respond to external stimuli can summon from within the collective self-image deep reservoirs of commitment. Not surprisingly, during the Second World War, the Soviet regime reverted to a careful cultivation of Russian national identity, invoking even the Orthodox Church in its appeals to the nation. This heroic image proved less ambiguous than newer, less controversial self-perceptions like the *homo sovieticus*. This dramatic self-perception gives a very particular cast to one's own sense of ego; it dominates the ways in which one perceives the world.

At the same time, however, this pattern of decision-making, in which choices emerge 'naturally', works very poorly at times of struggle. National or ideological self-images tend toward the heroic and bear a strong eschatological flavour. There emerges normally a strong sense of constructing a future; indeed without such a sense of the future, national concerns tend to lose their ability to move people. The much commented upon 'American dream' has its analogues in other nations as well, especially those with aspirations to greatness, even if only as a retrieval of past greatness.[5]

Such a heroic identity, however, masks key dimensions of the process of decision-making. In particular, constructions of the future require attentiveness to the past, with a consequent realization of one's strengths and fallibilities. Such a sense of 'conversion' toward a more authentic sense of identity emerges as a key element in discernment generally, even in prosaic matters of national priorities. The ability to take into account one's 'history of sin', whether that which one has done or that which one has undergone, as well as one's vulnerability, reveals the key areas in which a person, a nation or any group requires conversion. In the process, the recognition of such a history opens up new possible futures, potentially expanding a sense of 'self-interest'.

Of course, such an awareness of the true state of affairs, in particular the ways in which an identity masks the good or causes harm, comes at a price.

> . . . even if the existing structures of injustice do not derive from the sins of this or that individual, the requirement remains for ethical and Christian solidarity with those who suffer under structures of injustice. This requirement is repentance in an analogous sense: repentance from being closed in on one's own interests and blind to the justified claims of the disadvantaged. Such a solidarity is not something we are born with; one's ego must be forced to discover it.[6]

Conversion opens one to the 'other' and to the self; it frees one from those aspects of ego which are blinding. The reality remains, however, that both individuals and nations resist such questions as assaultive. The stronger the association with a particular self-image, the more likely will be the resulting resistance.

This becomes particularly important in any consideration of the moral roots of the cold war, or of those 'hot wars' which embody very similar dynamics, as in the crisis in Yugoslavia. The relationship between a 'mythic' sense of self and one's perception of others remains ambiguous, not necessarily given to the process of demonization. The threat faced has to reach 'epic' or 'cosmic' proportions, touching upon nothing less than the survival of the nation or the person.

In her recent work on the rise of demonic language within the Christian tradition, Elaine Pagels makes an important point, namely that such 'theological' language responds directly to *social* stimuli. In this, the western tradition, and, it would seem, its contemporary heirs, has raised the ante.

> . . . this virtually universal practice of calling one's own people human and 'dehumanizing' others does not necessarily mean that people actually doubt or deny the humanness of others. Much of the time . . . those who so label themselves and others are engaging in a kind of caricature that helps define and consolidate their own group identity . . .
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> Conflict between groups is, of course, nothing new. What may be new in Western Christian tradition, as we shall see, is how the use of Satan to represent one's enemies lends to conflict a specific kind of moral and religious interpretation, in which 'we' are God's people and 'they' are God's enemies, and ours as well.[7]

The ability to place oneself and one's cause at the centre of universal history brings with it a reshaped ethical dialogue.

Pagel's point in associating the rise of 'demonic' language with both a cosmic self-identity as God's (or history's?) people and a real threat to social stability and status ties in with our earlier consideration of the

difficulty of responding to those challenges which require self-critique. The more one can identify one's cause with ultimate purposes, the more dangerous the self-critique. Moreover, the more one can neatly circumscribe an external cause to such a threat, the easier it becomes to provide an absolute justification for a refusal to pay attention to underlying concerns. One virtually needs the external enemy as a safeguard of so cherished an underlying self-understanding. If 'they' were not there, one would have to invent 'them'. Paradoxically, precisely such a heroic struggle can ground an appeal to Herculean efforts in defence of 'the good'.

The irony in the confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States with their respective 'blocs' lies precisely in the way in which the 'religious' dimension of blindness plays itself out. On the one hand, the 'religious' considerations so central to Pagel's theory find a new form in this dialogue, namely the 'ideological', the perfect form for the 'modern world'.[8] Only the modern age, with its ability to theorize the absolute, could have such a dramatic turn, one with potentially disastrous consequences.

At the same time, a second consideration emerges. As with Pagel's treatment of the conflict, first between Christians and Jews and then within the Church between 'orthodox' and 'heretics', the battle between the USSR and the USA found its roots in the extraordinary similarity between the two adversaries. Both arise from the pretensions of the modern, capitalist era, though with diametrically opposed perceptions on the implications of the new age. Both resolve questions of ultimate value in terms of power read in politico-economic ways. Only such a cosmic clash could give rise to the truly demonic. Interestingly, of course, no similar concerns arose about Nazism in the West, given Hitler's claim to share the economic, if not the political, values of the West. Importantly, only in the wake of Pearl Harbor *and* Nazi Germany's declaration of war did the language of demonization arise in the US. With Stalinist Russia, Nazi Germany shared only a totalitarian political system, a link dramatically lacking stability.

Ironically, then, and it is a cold irony, in difficult times of internal stress the external foe with cosmic meaning provided a necessary reason to turn away from the self-critique and possible conversion which a realignment of national priorities would have required. The stability provided by the external threat allowed for an internal marshalling of resources. At the same time, though, in both the US and in the Soviet Union and its successor states, the underlying social tensions refused to go away. In the wake of the cold war, these 'ghosts' could take the place of 'demons'.

Reflections on our present era

The questions raised to this point leave begging one significant concern: of what importance are such moral dimensions to a geopolitical struggle? Clearly they have historical importance in coming to any understanding of the dynamics of a half century which has so marked us. The primary issue, however, lies more in the *present* impact of ideological struggle, in particular, though not exclusively, within the United States and the successor states of the Soviet Union. The loss of so familiar a context has proved jarring, to say the least.

We are left with a number of key questions. How has 'victory' during the cold war affected western, notably American, public discourse? How has the vindication of the efforts expended against 'the evil empire' helped reshape a vision of the future? At the same time, what happens to the heirs of the Soviet Union, grand loser in the contest? Finally, what happens in the absence of 'absolute evil', of an opponent worthy of apocalyptic language? Saddam Hussein, the Ayatollah, and a host of others have failed to fill the shoes. Yet, does the dynamic die?

In many ways, the current state of affairs within the United States provides a useful point of reference. The self-congratulation evident in the US in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union provided a retroactive justification for the awesome sacrifices of money, persons and corporate will. More importantly, given the cosmic scope of the battle, it provided a vindication for the 'western system' itself which had survived the test. Far from allowing for a critical appraisal of the ways in which cold war reasoning had reshaped the course of American (and western) thought, victory provided a convenient pretext for rejecting any such concerns. The structure of demonic opposition proved itself extraordinarily resilient and productive.

Indeed, the sense of cosmic battle had been quite exhilarating. On the one hand, this has engendered an extraordinary millenarianism among many. Jack Kemp, one-time Republican Presidential candidate, put it dramatically.

> It's ironic to me that at the collapse of communism there's a collapse of confidence on the Right . . . Our revolution is now global. It won't be long before the Declaration of Independence is basically the lodestar for everybody from Tiananmen Square to Wenceslaus Square to Soweto . . .[9]

An equally powerful and darker version also emerges, one redolent with earlier fears as a catalyst for action. Dick Cheney, another

Republican would-be President, casts the present challenge in the following terms:

> But our first failing was in allowing ourselves and the American people to be lulled into a false sense of security – into believing that all is right with the world and that the end of the Cold War as we've known it for the last 40 years meant that it was safe to devote all our time and attention to domestic pursuits.[10]

The battle continues in many ways, though now in a different key. While the references to this point lie on the conservative side, the rhetoric of absolutes potentially intoxicates all. A battle cast in heroic terms avoids the unique problem associated with recasting key domestic issues.

Both sources cited to this point would again point the United States and others beyond national boundaries toward adversaries further afield who would stand in the way of triumphant western (read American) values. Yet, such external foes have proven curiously unable to elicit the powerful response Soviet Communism did. What enemy would be potent enough both to galvanize forces into action and to turn eyes away from the enduring structural problems requiring attention?

Lacking credible external sources, the logical candidates for 'demonic' status threatening the bright future are increasingly domestic. Given a need to avoid the questions which would require self-critique, a campaign against 'heretics within' takes the role of the battle against evil without. Given the moral concerns at the heart of the need to associate oneself with virtue and the 'other' with evil, those who have failed to live up to the expectations of 'the dream' and who threaten the future become the targets for attack.

> Although the inequalities of income in the United States are now greater than at any time since the 1930s, and although numerous observers have remarked on the fact and cited abundant statistics in support of their observations, the response of the American overclass has been to blame everybody but its nonexistent self . . . James K. Glassman dismissed the idea that public policy can help the majority of workers whose real wages continue to fall: '[T]he ultimate answer lies with workers themselves. . . . Government can help a bit through tax breaks for education, but ultimately the cure for low working wages may be nothing more than high personal diligence.'[11]

Behind much of the attack on racial, ethnic or class groups today lies a need for a 'moral cleansing', a call particularly notable in the US. The

failures of 'the weak', not those of the system, lie behind the problems experienced by capitalism triumphant.

This is, however, insufficient, since no particular person can occupy the demonic role. The specifically religious dimension of the equation here deals more clearly now with the *economic* realm, though this has been the sub-text of the clash of opposites. Economic issues become ultimate, in a personal and in a moral sense.

> [T]he sacred order which structures individual action in American, Western, and, increasingly, world culture is primarily 'represented' in the economic realm . . . Because the economic realm is the dominant sector of our age, the sacred order of our culture is now peculiarly 'economic'.[12]

Not surprisingly, given the equation of 'the market' with questions of ultimate concern, economics becomes the new 'cause' for a crusade. The great enemies continue in new forms. In particular, one finds nemeses in 'big government' and 'dependent classes'. The ways in which 'big government' redirects income 'unnaturally' for the benefit of 'special interests' weakens the moral fibre of the nation and the world (the sub-text of all 'dependency' language) and frustrates the engine of progress and growth (the unrestricted market). The battle against heretics and sinners, agents of the 'socialist demon', takes on a religious fervour and cloaks attacks on the disadvantaged in a robe of righteousness.

Such a perception, however, only deepens the resistance to self-critique which lay at the core of cold war concerns. It fails to take into account the reality that the Soviet Union collapsed precisely because of its failure to note a serious underlying social, political, economic and spiritual malaise which not even the efforts of *perestroika* could reverse. *Perestroika* only revealed a dry rot which had rendered the entire society vulnerable to collapse, a moral condition which now bedevils the successor states of the Soviet Union. There, too, powerful movements seek to use the national, the rational, or the theocratic to turn attention away from a thorough self-critique, as in the positions of the far right or those exemplified by Vladimir Zhirinovsky. The longer term work of social and spiritual reconstruction require a humility and an authenticity which are allegedly less heroic than the martial spirit.

In the United States, and elsewhere (the continuing legacy of Thatcherism in the United Kingdom, for example), blind attention to 'economic rationalism' as the slogan of a new crusade only exacerbates profound domestic tensions. We see a gradual yet dramatic erosion in

the sense of 'common social space' as real personal needs fall increasingly on the shoulders of the individual. Authentically human interests, neither divine nor demonic, fade into the background as personal or moral issues. The lessons learned erroneously from the 'success' of the West in the refusal to 'appease' may entail a very heavy cost, nothing less than the repetition of the kind of social and spiritual chaos we see emerging in Eastern Europe.

Conclusion

We began this discussion by hearing the pope's optimistic words on the occasion of the fall of Communism in Eastern Europe. Perhaps more than ever today, we find ourselves in need of a more thoroughgoing experience of the mystery of the cross, which both convicts us of sin and offers liberation. The illusory appeals to a 'victorious ideology' require a clear and compelling rejoinder, one to be found only in an increasing and deliberate solidarity with those who reveal the moral failings of the system, not those who find themselves burdened. As the cross reveals God's solidarity with the real human condition, so too Christians and all people of conscience have to engage in an explicit attentiveness to the signs of real human needs which are left unnoticed in a 'grand crusade'. Eschatological ideology will not allow that; communities of value today increasingly have to become the voice which raises a critique of easy self-congratulation at the expense of the helpless.

Perhaps, then, another set of papal concerns will emerge which echo the concerns of people of conscience, like Václav Havel or Tadeusz Mazowiecki, all of whom have lived with the monstrous pretensions of blinding ideologies.

> [A] true pilgrim of the truth is called to carry out the role of a critical conscience with regard to all forms of totalitarianism or conformism . . .
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> How many wars have been fought and how much blood has been shed in the name of ideologies worked out in theory and not sufficiently fleshed out through real contact with people, with their tragedies and their true needs.[13]

NOTES

[1] John Paul II, *Centesimus annus*, no 25.

[2] This topic requires far more development than space here allows. See, though, for more information, Elaine Pagels, *The origin of Satan* (New York: Random House, 1995), chapter 2, or Neil Forsyth, *The old enemy: Satan and the combat myth* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987).

[3] Sally Ann McReynolds, in her article 'Memory and faith: tested by eschatological hope' in the January 1995 issue of this journal, made a telling point concerning the ability to discern the future. She notes that '[h]istory shares with all forms of narrative the power of a story to express and orient human experience with respect to time' (p 35). The ability to edit out a significant portion of the historical narrative reinforces the ability of those in power to maintain that power.

[4] Terrence E. Deal and Allen A. Kennedy, *Corporate cultures: the rites and rituals of corporate life* (Reading MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co, 1982), p 21.

[5] This self-perception perceives itself as 'common sense', obvious. From a moral perspective, however, the possibility for self-deception inherent in 'common sense' has to be taken into account. Cf Bernard J. F. Lonergan, *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan* vol 5, eds Elizabeth A. Morelli and Mark D. Morelli, revised and augmented Frederick E. Crowe et al. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), pp 93–98.

[6] Josef Fuchs, 'Structures of sin' in Josef Fuchs SJ, *Moral demands and personal obligations*, trans Brian McNeil (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 1993), p 72.

[7] Pagels, *op. cit.*, p. xix.

[8] Note in particular Edith Wyschogrod's critique of the loss of contemplation in 'modern' theory. Cf Wyschogrod, *Saints and postmodernism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), p 134.

[9] Cited in David Frum, *Dead right* (New York: Basic Books, 1994), p 96.

[10] *Ibid.*, p 184.

[11] Michael Lind, 'To have and have not', *Harper's* (June 1995), p 43.

[12] John Boli, 'The economic absorption of the sacred' in Robert Wuthnow (ed), *Rethinking materialism: perspectives on the spiritual dimension of economic behavior* (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans, 1995), p 94.

[13] John Paul II, 'What church social teaching is and is not' (delivered in Riga on 9 September 1993), *Origins* 23 (1993–94), p 256.