THEOLOGICAL TRENDS

Philosophy of Religion: The Great Divide

Section one: the challenge

THE BRITISH PHILOSOPHERS Hume, Russell, Ayer and many others have attacked religion and particularly Christianity in different ways. Their attacks were direct and clear-cut. The 'threat' (if threat they represented) could be readily identified. I want to argue that the developments in philosophy of religion, particularly over the last five years, are an even greater and more subtle threat. They are 'greater' and 'more subtle' precisely because they need not appear as a threat at all and many Christians would not look on it in these terms. It can be seen as a sensible development of Christian ideas and to be part of a continued development process which should take the Church through into the next century. In this paper I will first outline the 'new' approach and then, in the second part, will show some grounds on which it can be challenged by traditional Christianity.

The views put forward here have been influenced by Wittgenstein's philosophy and look partly for the meaning of theological terms within the language of the religious community. Much development has taken place, however, and it is unlikely that Wittgenstein would recognize many of his second and third generation disciples. I am going to group together the views of a number of philosophers including Don Cupitt, Norman Malcolm, Dewi Phillips and Stewart Sutherland, no one of whom would accept the outline as an accurate account of their own views. However, although their views are not identical, they are nevertheless sufficiently similar to provide a helpful if not precise focus. Professor Stewart Sutherland (now Principal of Kings College, University of London) has produced one of the most sophisticated of the modern accounts of talk about God (*God, Jesus and belief*, 1984), and, in particular, I owe much to him in this outline.

In Genesis, God walks in the garden with Adam. He appears to Moses in the burning bush and talks to the prophets in the Old Testament and directly rewards and punishes his people. As time passes, the biblical writers become more sophisticated and their ideas of God become more transcendent and less anthropomorphic. However, even in the New Testament God is seen as a Father who has a Son, he has many mansions in heaven and Jesus will sit on his right hand and wine will be drunk. Jesus after death still has a body and ascends to heaven. The early Church, under the influence of Plato, saw God as more transcendent —

outside space and time, immutable, perfect, omnipotent, omniscient and omnipresent. Progressively, therefore, God has become more abstract and the ideas put forward here take this process to its natural conclusion.

Plato had his god, the Demiurge, fashion the pre-existent, chaotic material of the universe on the model of the 'forms'. Plato's forms were completely unchanging, uncreated and outside time and space. There were many 'forms' representing the perfect ideas of, for instance, Truth, Justice, Beauty and Goodness. Because the universe was in time, the Demiurge had to fashion the universe, using pre-existent material, as a 'moving image of eternity' using the forms as a model. Whatever the strengths and weaknesses of this view, the importance of the forms was undoubted to Plato although it can be argued whether or not they 'existed' and if so in what sense.

On the 'modern' view (as I will term the picture I am attempting to outline) God is seen as existing. However this 'existence' is the final result of the progressive abstraction process that began in Genesis and has continued ever since. Just as the forms exist, outside time and space, so God exists: not in any sense as an entity, a being, a person or a substance, but as an idea which is a reality — an idea in the minds of religious people or a possible way of living life representing all that is perfectly true, just, honourable and good. Within religious language God necessarily exists. An analogy to God's existence on this view might be with prime numbers — within mathematics, prime numbers exist. The numbers 1,3,5,7,11 and so on *are* prime numbers. If you denied the existence of prime numbers, a mathematician might try to show you their meaning and to convince you of their existence. However, if, in the end, you could not understand their importance and denied their existence, you would not affect the mathematician's use for them. He has a use for the idea of prime numbers. Once he can show that reality and human reason will tolerate the idea of prime numbers, then they exist. However, prime numbers are not entities. Similarly, on this view, for the religious believer God necessarily exists — the believer cannot doubt God's existence. The fact that the unbeliever has no use for the idea of God does not affect the believer in any way — except possibly to cause him regret. Just as the mathematician may regret his inability to communicate the idea and importance of prime numbers, so the Christian will regret (although much more so due to the centrality to him of the idea of God) the unbeliever's inability to comprehend the importance and reality of the idea of God. There is, to be sure, no 'thing' or 'spirit' to which the word 'God' refers, but Christianity has rightly been nervous of talk of God as a 'thing'. God is not like an undiscovered planet — he is not an object to be found at the end of a chain of causes. To think of God as a person or as a thing at all is at best based on a manmade

picture of God and at worst 'degrades God to the level of the world' (as Niebuhr put it in relation to the cosmological argument).

The view being put forward here enshrines two cornerstones: 1) The reality of God within religious language, and 2) The central place ascribed to the ethical as providing the basis for human transcendence. D. Z. Phillips's approach tends to emphasize the former, Stewart Sutherland the latter.

When Jesus was tempted in the wilderness, many today would not consider that an individual called 'the Devil' was involved. Jesus was wrestling with one side of his human character and by standing against the temptations he showed great inner strength, conviction and steadfastness. If this view is accepted, why should not a similar approach be adopted in Gethsemane? Why, when Jesus prayed to the Father, does the Christian want this 'Father' to be any more an existing entity than 'the Devil'? Jesus may have gone through the agony of Gethsemane and prayed as the New Testament tells us. He wrestled with the real possibility of avoiding death on the next day. However, he refused to let his life or work be trivialized. He remained true and with fortitude and calm courage went to his death. Jesus wrestled with a real choice as to how his life should be lived — whether he could go to an agonizing death in a way that would not devalue the different quality of life that he had lived. The possibility that when he chose to go to his death he was not mistaken rests on the idea that a different perspective on the world and on human life is open — that it is possible to live one's life according to values that the 'world' does not accept.

Religious language and religion preserve a perspective on the world which is not relative. They enshrine and affirm a possible perspective on life which is, as Sutherland puts it, *sub specie aeternitatis*. This is not a position which can be reduced to morality. Morality is relative — culture and tradition have a central role. However, in any society the possibility exists for any individual to appeal beyond the accepted morality to a wider truth preserved in religion — to affirm the possibility of life lived *sub specie aeternitatis*. This is a transcendent perspective, a greater and broader viewpoint on the universe and human existence. Thus a Wilberforce could stand against the accepted morality and campaign for the abolition of slavery by appeal to a higher truth. Similarly the pioneering reformers who have led society to change its views about child labour, battered wives, homosexuality, the toleration of other religions and the like were not solitary fanatics but have judged the existing order from a higher viewpoint. This higher viewpoint, however, does not depend on the existence of a God as in any sense a 'being', 'substance' or 'thing'. Talk of 'God', rather, enshrines this viewpoint. In a way the view *sub specie aeternitatis* is an updating of Plato's forms. Truth, Justice, Beauty and Goodness do exist — not as the attributes of an unknown

and unknowable God as in the traditional Christian view, but as real, existent possibilities in life. This is (as Sutherland claims) to make an ontological commitment, a commitment about the nature of reality — it is to affirm that the world will tolerate such a perspective. The view provides us with 'relative forms' which have the power to adapt over time whilst retaining a type of participation in perfection. This is to affirm a case for religion, but one that excludes special revelation. It is to think in terms of Locke's 'natural religion'. No 'God' seen as a person or individual spirit is necessary. However, talk of God is still essential and to take religion away from man is to deprive him of possibilities which give value and point to the whole of human existence.

This view also stands for an older and less defined feeling on the part of many who have not found God and yet, in spite of this, feel their common humanity and the moral imperative. Such a demand to see the common lot of humanity as conditioned by finitude and the individual as part of the broader mass of mankind can be an uplifting one. There are now over four billion people on this planet and few of them are content. Many suffer unnecessarily from disease, hunger, poor political systems, oppression and in general man's inhumanity to man. Even those who live in the peaceful and affluent West are rarely at peace with themselves. The individual who can truly identify with and 'love' others, who can show compassion and understanding to their diverse needs, who can, in other words, 'transcend himself' and yet do this for no hope of a reward either in this life or the life to come is a man indeed. This transcendence is not, however, to be equated with obedience to the will of an outsider power figure called God. It is rather the affirmation of the existence of an alternative way in which life can be lived.

This view has a great deal to commend it. We do not need the idea of an 'interventionist' God who answers some prayers and not others, performs miracles (if miracles are to be thought of as interventions) on no very clear grounds, raises people from the dead and then judges them and tolerates a world in which there is much evil. Ivan's rejection of God on moral grounds in *The Brothers Karamazov* can be a good starting point for a theodicy. Holders of the view I am outlining here would maintain that theologians, by starting from a defined God, create all sorts of problems which would not arise if they started from the facts of the human condition and our common human experience.

All this is very well, however, but does it represent a life that can be lived by the 'good man' and can the religious person identify with these ideas? Let us take a practical example. Let us imagine a Jesuit philosopher of mature years who comes to the conclusion after some twenty years in the Society that to think of God as a personal being, entity or spirit is not just problematical but does not make sense. Much to his regret, he decides on reflection that there is no God 'out there' as traditionally

conceived. What does he do with his life? Does he decide to seek release from his vows, to abandon the Society and to go out into the outside world? I am not sure he does or should.

A friend convinced by the views I am putting forward might say to him:

> I accept that you can no longer believe in the traditional idea of a God and that you are, at best, agnostic about any idea of a life hereafter. Surely, however, the life you are living is worthwhile — you have devoted twenty years to self-mastery, to serving others and to negating yourself. These years have not been wasted. You are living a good and coherent life and, above all, a life that cannot be trivialized. Your treasure is in heaven — not in the form of a kingdom after death which you can no longer accept, but you cannot be hurt or distracted by the difficulties and problems of this world. The good man cannot be harmed and you are a good man. To be sure, you could be better, but we are all human and that is a common human failing. You are striving towards the best and you are serving others with as much love and compassion as lies in you. Surely it is right to continue along this path.

Holders of this view thus see no reason why this approach should not be accepted and why the absence of a being or spirit called God should in any way devalue the life the man is living.

Socrates and Jesus refused to allow their lives to be trivialized by escaping from the death that awaited them. To both of them, it was more important that they should die for what they believed in than that they should be untrue to themselves and to the way in which they had lived life. Both can be seen as paradigms of what humanity is capable of and both affirm the possibility of a man becoming, in some sense, like God.

It is right to ask what implications this view would have for some theological issues. Obviously only the briefest sketch can be given, but the following might be examples:

1) *The attributes of God*

God is traditionally held to be and to have the summit of all the perfections — perfect goodness, justice, truth, knowledge, wisdom and beauty. He is also omnipresent, omnipotent, omniscient, immutable and outside time and space. The idea of God enshrined in religious language can possess all these ideas necessarily and analytically. It is rather more difficult to attach such attributes to any existing entity, being or person

referred to as God. If I take the wings of the morning and flee to the uttermost ends of the earth, even there will the reality of the idea of God be with me — so will prime numbers.

2) *Prayer*

Prayer is something of a problem for theologians and philosophers. It is not at all easy to give an adequate account of petitionary prayer, partly because of an apparent need to preserve the possibility of an interventionist God acting in response to prayer. Surely, holders of this view can argue, true petitionary prayer should be summed up in 'Thy will be done' — in the believer trying to accept whatever will be the case and coming to terms with it. Similarly prayer for forgiveness is well described by Kant as the attempt by the believer to turn round his will and to achieve an inner change by reflection and recognition of his sin. Such ideas fit in very well with 'God' as an idea — even if it is an idea in some way enshrined in the universe or within the believing community. D. Z. Phillips's book *The concept of prayer* makes this clear. Prayer should not be looked on as getting some 'Being' to do something, but as helping to bring about an inner transformation in the individual making the prayer.

3) *Miracles*

Hume's definition of miracles concentrated too heavily on the 'magic tricks' department of religion. Of greater significance, it can be argued, is the potential for the believer to see the whole of life as a miracle — particular events or things in the world are seen as pointing to God. Since God is in all human life and in all natural processes, all is miracle. The believer sees the idea of God as present everywhere. Just as the artist will see beauty in all areas of life, so the religious believer will see everything pointing to God. A true miracle is the possibility of the transformation of human life in even the most unlikely situations. Such possibilities are fully compatible with the 'idea of God' outlined here.

4) *Life after death*

Wittgenstein asked what mystery would be solved if he was to live for ever. Certainly the idea of heaven and hell as places after death are not at all easy to explain philosophically. There are identity problems in the transition from here to there and whilst heaven and hell are fertile fields for speculation, it is much more difficult to give adequate philosophic content to them. The idea of eternal life as a quality in this life now is coherent and can be expounded through the 'idea of God' view and the possibilities for the individual re-orientating his life. John's gospel emphasizes such a quality in this life and it is, perhaps, significant that the words of absolution in the Church of England's Alternative Service

Book have been significantly changed from the Book of Common Prayer. The original version was: 'Almighty God . . . have mercy on you; pardon and deliver you from all your sins; confirm and strengthen you in all goodness and *bring you to everlasting life* . . . ' The A.S.B. changes this to: 'Almighty God . . . have mercy upon you, pardon and deliver you from all your sins, confirm and strengthen you in all goodness, and *keep you in life eternal* . . .' In other words, eternal life is seen 'here and now'. To be sure, neither version rules out the other, but the priorities have been changed. Jesus can be seen as resurrected in the spirit of his Church and the true significance of this resurrection as lying in the effect of Jesus' life and death on his disciples. A modified christology may be required (as Jesus did not rise from the dead as an individual on this view), but theologians are no strangers to the need to re-consider the meaning of the language used in the old formulations.

I suggest that this approach to 'God' and his 'existence' is not as such a development but is a real and highly significant threat. It is a view that has widespread philosophic appeal particularly to some sophisticated theologians who are aware of the problems inherent in the idea of God as in any sense personal; to those who are interested in Christianity and yet are on the fringes of religion or to those (and there are an increasing number of them) who wish to move towards a 'universalist' type approach. It has a particular appeal in multi-faith schools where Christianity is now sometimes taught in broadly these terms. All religions can be seen as affirming a different way of living life as well as the possibility of human transcendence. I suggest that the challenge (if challenge it is considered to be, and I accept that others may not see it like this) needs to be recognized and met.

Section two: grounds for a possible response

If I am unhappy or discontented it does not need an object for me to have these feelings. If, however, I am in love or jealous or consumed by hatred and no person or object or thing exists to which my emotion is directed, I am then mistaken and my emotion is at least out of place. It may, indeed, be fair to say that I am deluded. The question is whether God is necessarily or contingently related to religious talk. For the sake of clarity, by 'God' I here mean an existing, personal, loving spirit 'existing' in some way apart from the universe he has made. I do *not* think a concept or an idea (however 'real' this may be) will fill the same role.

Love of my wife and love of the idea of democracy are, somehow, of a different order and the degree of commitment I might feel appropriate to the two similarly differ. In the same way there is a gulf between the 'God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob' and a 'concept-God'. If Jesus prayed to his Father, went about his Father's business, taught others about his

Father's house, went through the mental agony of Gethsemane with the real wish that his Father would release him from it and, at the last, commended himself to his Father's hands, then it seems to me that he is thoroughly mistaken, completely deluded and to be pitied or condemned (depending on whether he knew or not) if his Father does not exist as, in some sense, a personal individual with whom the believer can have a personal relationship. God, in effect, needs to be a subject whom the believer can address as 'Thou'.

On this basis, to maintain 'God-talk' while denying, or being agnostic about, the existence of any being or spirit to which the word refers is to miss out the real significance of the word. There is more to theology than the discussion of moral possibilities. Jesus in his words and life *is* making a particular kind of metaphysical claim (that there is a being called 'God') and to eliminate this is to eliminate the central meaning of his life.

The ethical view sees Jesus's importance in terms of it demonstrating the possibility of a man leading a really good life or being perfectly good. There is a difference between saying that Jesus's life was special because it was a reflection of God and that Jesus led a fulfilled life. Sutherland, in particular, wants to deny the first because of the difficulties he finds in the idea of 'a God' (he starts from rejection of this on the basis that it is not a viable starting point — particularly due to the problem of evil. I accept the need to take this problem seriously and also accept that many theologians have started from an idea of God, possibly passed down by the Church and influenced heavily by Plato, rather than from starting with the world as we know it). There could be merit in starting to talk about God based on premises which include the problem of evil rather than coming to it as a separate stage, but it is talk about God that one is involved with, not the definition of an idea or a possibility — however 'real' this may be.

If the traditional idea of God is denied, therefore, I am maintaining that: 1) We do not need a traditional theology. Ethics can move over to fill out the meaning and possibilities of life, and 2) Jesus is deluded and, whilst an interesting and significant figure, is no more than that. The following might be among the approaches that could be developed to support this view. I was tempted to introduce an appeal to historical truth here, but have not done so. I am not sure, however, that advocates of the linguistic view would be able to explain adequately the growth of the early Church, although it is not difficult to see the grounds on which such an attempt at an explanation would be made.

1) *Religion as a possibility*

The view put forward in the first section maintains that to see life *sub specie aeternitatis* is a possibility for humanity and the existence of this

possibility enables us to see the world in a new light. On this view, morality is related to the structure of the world and can itself be judged by how it 'fits' with this structure. We have, therefore, something on the lines of Kant's 'categories of the understanding'. This is a much lesser claim than, for instance, Plato's theory of the forms which in some way were the ultimate — independent of time and space and even of the Demiurge.

It is impossible to draw a perfect circle, but we can use such an idea and try to approach it more closely. Similarly, it might be maintained, it may be impossible to live a perfect life, but an individual can try to bring his life as near perfection as possible. However unlike the parallel of a circle, there is no single form of a perfect life. Instead of moving closer to metaphysical perfection as Plato would have thought, we can only move closer to some regulative idea of perfection which is ill-defined and likely to change over time. If we take the case of beauty, the platonic ideal was that there was a perfect form of beauty in which all beautiful things partook to a greater or lesser degree. The view being but forward in the first section, however, would deny a single form of beauty and would instead maintain that man was capable of appreciating beauty, that this showed the 'existence' or the possibility of beauty but that there was no outward form of it to which contemplation of beauty led us.

I am not disputing that this view is coherent, but would maintain that it reduces the value of beauty, truth, goodness and morality in general to a level at which they will still be admirable, but are no longer worth supreme sacrifice and suffering to arrive at. It therefore devalues the currency of theology.

2) *The question of meaning*

The 'modern view' requires us to find meaning in this life and asserts that it is possible to live a 'good life' which cannot be trivialized or overcome by adversity or even death. This sounds fine and it lies at the heart of the argument, but it is questionable whether the position is as straightforward as it appears. Just *what* meaning is a 'good life' meant to have? There seem to be various possibilities:

i) *Mankind has benefited from the individual's life.* In some way the 'good life' has advanced the cause of 'goodness' in society and this has or will benefit humanity. If this view is taken, it is a difficult one to get off the ground. For instance:

   a. It is not clear on any *prima facie* view what the 'good for man' is — the Greeks would have differed from the Utilitarians (who wished to maximize happiness) and the Marxists. On what basis is Socrates discontented happier than the pig with his nose in an overflowing trough? Once one moves from the

general to the particular, it becomes very difficult to make a judgment.

b. If the 'good for man' is intended, then for a life to have 'meaning' it must have had some positive results. Jesus's life might have passed this test, but most others would not. If one maintains with Kierkegaard and against Hume that the 'good' must be inner and cannot be defined in external terms (which I would want to do although I cannot argue for the point here), then it seems to rule out any test of goodness based on results.

c. If we imagine a man who lived a 'good life' as laid down and then imagined that the world came to an end in a nuclear holocaust at the same moment, it would be difficult to establish that his life had had 'meaning' other than for himself.

ii) *The individual himself has benefited from the life lived.* Socrates could be argued to have maintained this when pointing out that the tyrant Archelaus was not a fortunate man even though he had total power over his citizens. The man who hurts someone else, Socrates maintained, is more to be pitied than the man who is hurt as he harms his own soul (See Plato: *Gorgias*). Now Socrates' argument makes sense *if* you accept that a man has a soul that endures or if he in some way survives death so that his individuality, as a person, is precious. If, however, as is the case with proponents of this view, a life after death is ruled out, then it is much less clear why Archelaus is not a fortunate man. Certainly Socrates believed in a life after death and without this belief his arguments would have lacked an important premise.

Neither of these approaches seems particularly satisfactory and the 'meaning of life' which is based on one or other of them can similarly be called into question.

3) *Religious and moral beliefs*

It does not seem clear on the view presented in the previous section how religious and moral beliefs are to be separated. I can see that moral beliefs might be those that operate within a society whilst beliefs orientated towards the 'idea of God' might have wider perspective. Thus in El Salvador or Chile a man might claim 'religious grounds' for rejecting the locally accepted morality and thus appeal to a 'higher court' or a higher concept. However this does not explain the role or use of factual religious beliefs which are not concerned with how life is lived or the way in which man's finitude is to be interpreted. On the view put forward, the particular historical claims connected, for instance, with the sacraments would be rejected as not relevant except to the extent that they helped to remind people of the possibilities for self-transcendence. This is perfectly coherent, but it is a considerably lower claim than that

implied in religion and would involve religion abandoning or substantially re-interpreting a large part of its language and claims (unless these were to be maintained purely for their emotional content).

4) *The individual and society*

The primacy of the ethical view is the primacy of a social view of life. Morality involves other people and ethics comes from consideration of the needs of others as the first priority. In many religions, however, there is a tension present between the duty to others and duty to oneself. Christianity has always affirmed the importance of the individual and the first commandment calls on the Christian to put his 'God-relationship' (as Kierkegaard would have put it) above all else. Duty to others will arise from this relationship as all mankind is seen as fellow children of the one God. Sutherland's criteria rule out the possibility of religious demands calling an individual to act against ethical demands. Thus and for instance Abraham or, indeed, the Buddha who left family and fortune to seek enlightenment should have put their moral duties first. This is a position which could be questioned and important Christian insights seem to be lost with this new approach. Certainly the importance of the individual is likely to be undermined (although this is a two-edged sword and it might be argued that this is not a bad thing).

5) *The Jesuit philosopher*

In the first section I gave an example of a mature Jesuit philosopher who had come to the conclusion that it made no sense to talk of God as existing 'out there' as other than an idea or possible way in which life could be lived and who broadly agreed with the new approach being put forward here. I outlined an argument in which proponents of the 'modern' view might have suggested that his way of life was still valid and still carried meaning. I do not want to withdraw this, although I believe that the example given suffers from a weakness in one major area. *If* this Jesuit philosopher also happens to be a priest, then he is going to need to be a figure on somewhat similar lines to the Grand Inquisitor in Dostoyevsky's *The Brothers Karamazov*. As a priest, he will take services in which most ordinary believers actually do believe things that he (the philosopher) is now convinced are mistaken. For instance they believe that:

a. God actually exists as a loving, personal being or entity.
b. Prayer is in some sense a dialogue with God which is part of a two-way relationship and prayer can be answered by intervention on God's part.
c. Miracles occur, albeit seldom, in answer to prayer and these miracles are not to be thought of purely in providential terms.
d. There is a life after death for individuals and conduct in this life affects their fate after death.

These, and other beliefs, are incompatible with this new approach. If, therefore, the priest/philosopher is really to be true to himself, he has to refuse to take part in services which include these presuppositions. It may be, of course, that these beliefs are wrong, but in this case he has to say so. If he continues implicitly to endorse them, then he is effectively taking part in a charade and declining to be honest and open with people who respect and look up to him. As a philosopher, he cannot do this and remain true to himself. The Grand Inquisitor did this and justified his position to the Jesus figure on the grounds that the Church had taken the decision to distort the truth in the interests of the mass of humanity who could not cope with it. I suggest that this is a patronizing and manipulative attitude which would make his continued membership of a religious order questionable (at least so far as he himself was concerned). You may gather from this that I do not think that Don Cupitt should continue to be an Anglican priest!

I obviously do not have space to develop these arguments fully here and have merely tried to indicate some of the grounds for a possible attack on the new position. I do sincerely believe that its importance and the strength of its arguments must not be underestimated. Christians need to recognize that there is a 'Great Divide' between the traditional view of God as a loving, personal spirit apart from yet interactive with the universe he has made, and the idea or concept of God which exists within religious language (but not outside it) or which affirms a particular way of approaching the world.

Unless a strong counter-attack on the 'modern view' can be developed which takes seriously the weaknesses in the traditional theological position and yet affirms the central tenets of Christianity (which I would maintain includes the view of God stated above), then more and more people will find the new approach compelling. Perhaps, some may say, this is right and these philosophers are pointing the way forward to the future of Christianity. Certainly they should force holders of the traditional view to become clearer on what they mean by 'God' and his 'existence' and to be aware of the consequences of the new approach. This, at least, is something to be welcomed.

Søren Kierkegaard writing in his journal in 1851 in a different context could sum up the position: 'The very way in which modern philosophy speaks of existence shows that it does not believe in the immortality of the individual: it does not believe it at all: it comprehends only the eternity of concepts'. This could well be applied to the new position. Kierkegaard would have had none of it, but at least he recognized the challenge!

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NOTES

Some books that relate to this topic include:

D. Cupitt	*Taking leave of God* (SCM Press, 1980).
D. Z. Phillips	*The concept of prayer.*
D. Z. Phillips	*Faith and philosophical enquiry.*
S. Sutherland	*God, Jesus and belief* (Blackwell, 1984).
S. Sutherland	*Atheism and the rejection of God* (Blackwell, 1977).
K. Ward	*Holding fast to God* (SPCK, 1982).
L. Wittgenstein	*Investigations* (Blackwell, 1958).
L. Wittgenstein	*Lectures on religion and aesthetics* (Blackwell).