DIVINE CALL AND HUMAN RESPONSE

God in Confucianism, II

The development of Confucianism from Mencius onwards

HE HISTORY of Confucianism after the death of the Master and his immediate successors, the authors of Chung-yung and Ta-hsuen, covers a period of about two thousand five hundred years. Two philosophers in particular have influenced its development up to the present day. They are Meng-tzu, or Mencius (371-289 B.C.?), and Hsün-tzu who came on the scene about 298 B.C. when Mencius left it, and who died in 238. Each of them has contributed to the expression of distinct lines of thought which find their source in the doctrine of the Master. They hold positions which are not simply different, but at times are diametrically opposed. As Wingtsit Chan comments:

Mencius and Hsün Tzu have generally been considered as representing the two divergent tendencies of idealistic Confucianism and naturalistic Confucianism in ancient China. Whether these two tendencies were derived, correspondingly, from the *Doctrine of the Mean* and the *Great Learning* is not clear. At any rate, by teaching the doctrine of the original evil nature of man and the necessity of control through laws and rules of property, Hsün Tzu stood diametrically opposed to Mencius whose doctrine professed the original goodness of human nature and moral intuition as the source of political and social development. Generally speaking, Hsün Tzu was naturalistic and Mencius idealistic.²

Through the ages these two tendencies have survived, constituting two emphases which have competed with each other. The influence of Hsün-Tzu was predominant during the Han dynasty (206 B.C.-A.D. 220). Subsequently it was Mencius's thought which directed the development of the chinese thought. When Han Yü (A.D. 768-824) and Li Ao (fl. 798) reinstated confucian thought after many centuries of decadence they returned to the emphasis of Mencius. It was they who saved Confucianism when Buddhism and Taoism seemed to have triumphed. That is why they are considered (Han Yü in particular) as the originators of neo-Confucianism

which reached its peak during the Sung dynasty with Chu Hsi (1130-1200) and Wang Yang-ming (1472-1529).

Meng-tzu (Mencius) and Hsün-tzu

The career of Mencius strangely resembles that of Confucius.

Like Confucius, he was born in what is modern Shantung province. Like Confucius he was a professional teacher, having studied under the pupils of the grandson of Confucius. Like Confucius he idolized the legendary sage-emperors. Like Confucius he lived in a period of political struggle, moral chaos, and intellectual conflicts. Like Confucius he had a sense of mission, if only to suppress 'perversive doctrines'. . . . And like Confucius he was eventually disappointed and retired.³

However, in other respects, little is known of his life and his dates are uncertain.

What is known about him is his thought, and the book which carries his name is a work which is as important as the remainder of the 'Four Books'. If the *Book of Mencius* (the *Meng-tzu*) is compared with the *Analects* one can find a great resemblance, but also considerable differences:

First, the Analects of Confucius, which forms almost the only reliable source of our knowledge of the thought of Confucius, consists of a collection of sayings of the sage, mostly brief and often with little or no context. Hence many ideas are not elaborated upon, leaving a good deal of room for differences in interpretation. The Mencius too, consists of sayings of Mencius and conversations he had with his contemporaries, but these tend to be of greater length and there is often some kind of context. Thus the Mencius, when read side by side with the Analects of Confucius, throws a great deal of light on the latter work. Secondly, Mencius developed some of the ideas of Confucius and, at the same time, discussed problems not touched on by Confucius. It is no exaggeration to say that what is subsequently called Confucianism contains as much of the thought of Mencius as of Confucius.

On matters of doctrine it is clear that Mencius followed Confucius. But he took his master's thought a giant step forward in assuming a firm position on the question of human nature. We have seen that Confucius scarcely ventured into this territory, for he was more interested in human actions than in the basic nature from which they flowed. On this point of human nature which is central to confucian doctrine:

. . . Mencius took a big step forward, and his new theory coloured his other doctrines. While Confucius no more than implied that human nature is good, Mencius declared definitely that it was originally good. Moreover, he built his entire philosophy on this tenet, and was the first to do so.⁵

Mencius did not, therefore, simply encourage his followers to educate their human nature. He made them understand that it is completely and intrinsically good. If this is the case it is a result of an essential connection with Heaven. But the problem is that people do not concern themselves with recovering their basic goodness. Mencius presented the difficulty in a very imaginative way:

Mencius said, 'Humanity is man's mind and righteousness is man's path. Pity the man who abandons the path and does not follow it, and who has lost his heart and does not know how to recover it. When people lose their dogs and fowl, they go to look for them, and yet, when they have lost their hearts, they do not go to look for them. The way of learning is none other than finding the lost mind'. 6

The 'learning' which he talks about is not simply intellectual knowledge, but a knowledge of self, which leads to a knowledge of our basic nature. This is an intuition which the Buddhists were to develop and on which the idealist strand of neo-Confucianism would build the theory of intuitive knowledge.

Confucius had insisted, above all, on the balance between the individual and society and on the particular quality of humanity (jen) which makes a man into a person for others. Mencius placed man in the wider context of the universe and opened him, at the same time, to his true depths. It was this which revealed the cosmic and mystical dimension of his doctrine. Others would draw out the implications, but the basic intuitions are already present in the texts which are difficult to translate because of their great complexity.

The following text encapsulates the whole experience of Mencius in the context of his relationship with the universe, with himself and with humanity. 'All things are complete within me. If I reflect on myself and am sincere (with myself), there is no greater joy. When, in my conduct, I vigorously exercise altruism, then 'benevolence' (jen) is not far to seek, but right by me'. The sincerity in question here is a matter of being true to his basic nature. When someone achieves this identity with self and with the universe, he has no difficulty in opening himself to others. Inwardness and relationship, far from being opposed to each other, are intimately connected.

Another text, crucial to the teaching of Mencius, indicates the relationship between the 'heart', human nature and Heaven. 'He who exerts his mind to the utmost knows his nature. He who knows his nature knows Heaven. To preserve one's mind and to nourish one's nature is the way to serve Heaven'. It would be more expressive to translate the text as, 'he who goes to the extreme of his heart', but it is usual to translate the chinese character for 'heart' by 'mind' in such texts, where 'heart' means the inner reality of man. This way of proceeding is very characteristic of Confucianism. The way to Heaven comes through the heart and very nature of man. If human nature is good, it is because it is a gift and reflection of Heaven. Thus it is perfectly normal that to know one's human nature is already, in a very real sense, to know Heaven. The originators of the confucian renaissance, Han Yü and Li Ao, whom we have mentioned before, would return to these basic intuitions.

With Hsün-tzu we enter another world of thought. He brought to light a different tendency in confucian thought, a type of humanism which was pushed so far that it became detached from any religious preoccupations. His doctrine can be described as 'naturalistic Confucianism'. His idea of Heaven (T'ien) is purely naturalistic. For this reason a large number of historians of chinese philosophy have translated the term T'ien as 'nature'. This is a quite legitimate interpretation of Hsün-tzu's ideas.

Hsün-tzu's concept of Heaven is obviously closer to the *Tao* of the Taoists than to the *T'ien* (Heaven) of Confucius and Mencius. Their *T'ien* is still purposive and the source and ultimate control of man's destiny, but Hsün-tzu's *T'ien* is purely Nature, so that the word has to be translated as Nature rather than as Heaven. The marvellous thing is that while he accepted the Taoists' naturalistic view, he was not influenced by their intuitionism and mysticism. In Hsün-tzu we have rationalism and empiricism instead.¹⁰

It is possible to say that the humanist strand in chinese thought achieved its clearest expression in Hsün-tzu. In his chapter on Heaven (T'ien), Hsün-tzu depicts its activities:

To accomplish without any action and to obtain without effort, this is what is meant by the office of Heaven. This being the case, although the way of Heaven is deep, the perfect man does not deliberate over it. Although it is great, he does not devote any effort to it. And although it is refined he does not scrutinize it. This is what is meant by not competing with Heaven. Heaven has its seasons, earth has its wealth, and man has his government. This is how they are able to form a triad. To neglect (human activities) which constitute man's part in the triad and to put one's hope in those with which he forms a triad is indeed a mistake.¹¹

Hsün-tzu's pragmatic approach shows itself throughout his treatise. He does not believe that Heaven has the power to work miracles in response to man's prayer. 'When people pray for rain, it rains. Why? I say: there is no need to ask why. It is the same as when it rains when no one prays for it'. Further on, Hsün-tzu clarifies his attitude to Heaven:

Instead of regarding Heaven as great and admiring it, why not foster it as a thing and regulate it? Instead of obeying Heaven and singing praise to it, why not control the mandate of Heaven and use it? Instead of looking on the seasons and waiting for them, why not respond to them and make use of them? . . . Instead of admiring how things come to being, why not do something to bring them to full development? 13

This simple presentation of Hsün-tzu's thought, after that of Mencius, is enough to show how far they diverge. For Hsün-tzu it is not a question of turning to his deeper nature in order to find a way to Heaven. His influence was at its greatest during the Han dynasty (206 B.C.-A.D. 220) and then diminished. But it has always been an important aspect in the history of chinese thought and scientists and modern pragmatists certainly hold him in great esteem. In every sense Hsün-tzu and Meng-tzu threw light on the basic emphases which began to appear in Confucius's doctrine.

The development of confucian thought after Mencius and Hsün-tzu

During the Han period, confucian thought prospered by integrating various elements from other schools of thought. It is also the case that it includes aspects of cosmology which moved it in the direction of an esotericism which was certainly not in the spirit of Confucius. Confucian doctrines came to cover a vast range which stretched from practical theories of government to the cosmic theories of a dubious mysticism. Nevertheless, amongst these extravagant ideas there remained a human wisdom which was faithful to the Master. In a work which was produced by a group of confucian writers at the request of the emperor in A.D. 79, we can find such beautiful texts as this: 'All men contain in themselves the essence of Heaven and Earth, and harbour the instinct for the five Constant (Virtues)'. 'Another text expands our horizons on the connection of man with Heaven: 'Man is Heaven's cherished object'. '5 However, the tone of the work points to a still distant relationship between man and Heaven which conforms perfectly to the confucian tradition.

Thus Confucianism, after Mencius, continued to evolve. In the Han period it adopted a cosmology which nearly caused it to lose its balance by launching into an alien theory of man's relations with the cosmos. So, during the first centuries of the christian era, we see a great revival of popular religion. This is the period when what we call taoist religion was

developing. It is also the beginning of buddhist influence on China. During the period from the end of the second century A.D. to the end of the sixth century there was an extraordinary muddle of ideas and beliefs. China was divided. The northern dynasties were almost all of foreign origin and tended to favour Taoism or Buddhism, or a mixture of the two. Confucianism nearly disappeared in this turmoil: besides, what could it offer to the millions of Chinese who sought doctrines of salvation? When the founder of the Sui dynasty (A.D. 581-618) wished to re-establish the position which Confucianism had occupied under the Han, it seemed to him that China had gone Buddhist. However, at this time the movement which would return Confucianism to a leading position began to be effective.

The confucian reaction gained force from the beginning of the T'ang dynasty (A.D. 618-907) and shone brilliantly with Han Yü (768-824). Han Yü was not a philosopher but he was an inspired writer. He attacked violently both Buddhism and Taoism. The other great name associated with the revival of Confucianism is Li Ao, who died around 844.

Han Yü and Li Ao are usually considered as forerunners of the neo-Confucianism that developed in the eleventh century. Actually they were more than that. For they were not merely precursors of a movement; they did much to determine its direction. As philosophers they are quite negligible. There is nothing new in their theories of human nature . . . Han Yü's discussion of the Way is superficial and, unlike that of the Taoists and Buddhists, does not touch upon its deepest aspects. And yet they were key figures in the transition from the Confucianism of medieval China to neo-Confucianism. Han Yü, especially, stood out like a giant in the history of Confucianism from the second century B.C. to the tenth. He was of course one of the greatest literary masters China ever produced. So far as Chinese thought is concerned, his greatness and that of Li Ao lie in the fact that they saved Confucianism from its possible annihilation by Taoism and Buddhism and that they defined the direction and nature of its resurgence. 16

In order to reply to the challenge of Taoism and Buddhism, they had to search within confucian tradition itself, and they recognized in Mencius the medium by which the true thinking of the Master had been passed on to succeeding generations. Han Yü rejected strongly Hsün-tzu's interpretation of human nature and adopted instead the view of Mencius. This is why, as Fung Yu-lan says:

. . . the *Mencius* became a basic text for the Sung and Ming neo-Confucianists. There are good reasons for this phenomenon. Thus the mystical tendency apparent in Mencius's philosophy; his discus-

sions on mind and human nature; his statement that 'all things are complete within us. There is no greater delight than to find sincerity when one examines oneself' (Mencius, VIIa, 4); his method of self-cultivation through 'nourishing the mind' and 'making fewer the desires' (ibid., VIIb, 35): all these provided suitable answers to those same problems that were the centre of Buddhist discussion in Han Yü's day and were regarded by his contemporaries as particularly significant. It is not surprising, therefore, that the book of Mencius should be selected from confucian literature as the work which above all others was pertinent to these burning problems.¹⁷

Han Yü had been impressed by the quality of the spiritual life of some buddhist monks whom he had met. He admired their sense of interiority and their detachment from the things of this world. But he wished to live out these values in a confucian and not a buddhist way. So Han Yü firmly rejected buddhist religion and acts of piety such as the veneration of relics. For this reason he was banished to a distant region 'for having protested against the honour with which the emperor proposed to receive an alleged bone of the Buddha'. On the other hand Han Yü was affected by buddhist thought, especially Ch'an Buddhism (Zen in Japanese), which opened up for him new vistas on human nature.

He also wished to be freed from Taoism, and it is not without reason that he called his famous work *The Original Tao (Yuan Tao)* — which can be translated equally well as *The Original Way*. The *Tao* of which he spoke was quite different from that of the Taoists and Buddhists. This *Tao* is the true *Tao* which the wise man of old had attained and which all men can attain if they lay hold of the means. But it is in the practice of human virtues rather than through religious activities that the true Confucian can open himself to transcendence. Thus Confucianism recognizes that man can transcend himself ('man's ability to transcend himself'), but the mode of expression of this 'self-transcendence' differs in Confucianism, Buddhism and in Christianity.¹⁹

Between the movement, set in motion under the T'ang by Han Yü and Li Ao and the great renewal under the Sung in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, the confrontation between Buddhism and Taoism on one side and Confucianism on the other was more radical. In the end Confucianism triumphed. This neo-Confucianism was born of a very clear awareness of what is confucian in the conduct of human affairs and in the relationship with heaven and the universe. But to reach this point a long confrontation was necessary. This is why I think that at the present time a new confrontation is necessary between Christianity on the one hand and the three currents of thought which have been discussed here.

The neo-confucian synthesis and transcendence

The intellectual movement begun by Han Yü is known in history by the

name Tao-Hsüeh which can be translated as the 'School of the Tao'. From this 'school' there came, much later, two further 'schools', the one known as Li-hsüeh of the 'School of the Principle', and the other known as Hsin-hsüeh or the 'School of the Mind'. The first is commonly called the 'rationalist school' and the other the 'idealist school'. The leading representative of the first is Chu Hsi (A.D. 1130-1200) and of the second, Wang Yang-ming (1472-1529).

When one studies the history of the whole movement one comes to realize how slowly a distinction was made between the buddhist and taoist way of seeing things and the confucian. The terms used may be the same, but what is intended is different and frequently the distinction is extremely subtle and yet very clear. Fung Yü-lan explains the problem of influences very clearly:

There are three lines of thought that can be traced as the main sources of neo-Confucianism. The first of course is Confucianism itself. The second is Buddhism, together with Taoism via the medium of Ch'anism, for of all the schools of Buddhism, Ch'anism (Ch'an, or in Japanese, Zen) was the most influential at the time of the formation of neo-Confucianism. To the neo-Confucianists, Ch'anism and Buddhism are synonymous terms, and . . . in one sense neo-Confucianism may be said to be the logical development of Ch'anism. Finally, the third is the taoist religion, of which the cosmological views of the *Yin-yang* school formed an important element. The cosmology of the neo-Confucianists is chiefly connected with this line of thought.²⁰

This integration of the three great strands of chinese thought into a single system, confucian in inspiration, presents a striking example of the way in which systems of thought develop and manage to integrate elements from all corners of the globe. It is certainly an optical illusion produced by the textbooks which leads to the belief that chinese thought has always been static. It has always been moving, but deep down it retains an innate need to reach out to transcendence by way of immanence, while we western Christians prefer to seek immanence through transcendence.

It is impossible to take note of all the landmarks of this process of integration which was effected between the time of Han Yü and that of the great masters of neo-Confucianism. Nevertheless we can point to some of them.

Hou Tun-i (1017-73) had been deeply influenced by Buddhism and Taoism, but in his metaphysics he followed the ancient chinese tradition from the *Book of Changes (I-ching)*. He gave priority to the 'Non-Ultimate', taken from Taoism. But this 'Non-Ultimate' is also the 'Supreme Ultimate' of Confucianism. In his argument, Chou Tun-i shows clearly

that, in order to explain and unify everything, it is necessary to place over everything, a 'something' which can only be defined as the union of two contrary terms.²¹

For Chang Tsai (1020-77), the whole universe is 'one', but its manifestations are 'many'. Heaven and man are one. Love embraces them all. This philosophy is based on Mencius but its horizons are those of Buddhism. In his treatise Discipline for beginners, he writes 'by expanding one's mind, one is able to embody the things of the whole world'. ²² This idea of 'mind' certainly comes from Buddhism, as well as being a development of Mencius's thought. Fung Yu-lan continues: 'In this way, he (the sage) reaches a stage at which the entire universe is regarded by him as one supremely great ego'. ²³

What is shown in these philosophers is an attempt to broaden the horizons of confucian thought to include the whole cosmos, and to open it to the metaphysical world. The precursors of neo-Confucianism were influenced just as greatly by philosophical and mystical Taoism as by Ch'an Buddhism. In this effort, the two brothers Ch'eng hold a special place, having made the Li (The Principle) the basis of their metaphysical speculation. However, their thought was oriented in two different directions. Ch'eng Hao (1032-85), the elder of the two, with an intuitive temperament, moved towards a more 'idealistic' philosophy based on the Hsin or 'heart' and 'mind'. He originated the branch of neo-Confucianism called Hsin-hsueh, the 'study of the Mind'. His young brother Ch'eng I (1033-1108) with a more speculative temperament, is the origin of the other great branch of neo-Confucianism called Li-hsueh, the 'study of principle'. In each case the preoccupation with metaphysics is present. Each school seeks to open man to deeper realities - the one through reason and 'principle' and the other through the heart and 'Mind'.

The Li-hsüeh (Study, or School of Principle), took all its impetus from the great master of neo-Confucianism, Chu Hsi (1130-1200). Chu Hsi had developed a metaphysics which was not lacking in grandeur. He recaptured the main themes of the metaphysics of the great ancient chinese thinkers and developed them by taking account of taoist and buddhist thought.

Chu Hsi distinguished 'principles which have forms' from those which are 'beyond forms'. Above all these principles is found the 'Ultimate Li', the 'Ultimate Principle' of everything. This supreme Li 'has no feelings'. The 'Ultimate Li' and the 'Great Ultimate' (T'ai-chi) are found in all human beings. So man, through his deeper nature, is open to the Supreme Being. But this 'Being' is not, properly speaking, a 'being' at all but simply a supreme Principle. Here we are face to face with a purely philosophical system which seeks to be non-religious, but which nevertheless broadens man's outlook to the limits of transcendence.

In this tradition of the 'School of Principle', man is capable, in discovering the 'principle' (Li), of reaching out 'to an eternal, pure and ideal

world'. 24 Such a system makes us think of Aristotle, so much does he insist on the rational. But one should recall that the idea of Li reached a higher or deeper metaphysic similar to the idea of Tao in the great masters of Taoism. Despite its rationalism, the doctrine of Li-hsüeh the 'School of Principle', implied at the same time both immanence and transcendence.

In this tradition of the 'School of Principle', the 'Heavenly Principle' (T'ien-li) is said to subsist eternally. This Principle remains unchanging. 'As for the Principle, thoughout the world it is but one'. 25 Besides, everything which exists in the external world is contained 'within our own mind'. This is an echo of the phrase of Mencius already quoted: 'All things are complete within us'.

What is 'The Non-Ultimate . . . and yet also the Supreme Ultimate' for Chu Hsi? 'These words, says Chu Hsi, do not mean that it (the Supreme Ultimate) is a physical something glittering in a glorious manner somewhere. They only mean that, in the beginning, when no single physical object existed, there was nothing but Principle (li)'. This concept is certainly very metaphysical, but li or 'Principle' is certainly not what is called a 'subsistent being'.

To examine the theories of the other branch of neo-Confucianism is to find oneself in a different atmosphere. The way of proceeding is different from that of the 'School of Principle'. Lu Hsiang-shan (1139-93), the originator of this 'School of the Mind' was inspired by the philosophy of Ch'eng Hao, the elder of the two Ch'eng brothers. His philosophy and method are very close to those of Ch'an (Zen). He once remarked that 'the universe is my mind, and my mind is the universe'. 27 This was the result of a real insight and was enough for him. He had discovered his own greatness and also love (jen) for other people. 'Get your spiritual energies collected within, then when there is call for fellow-feelings, you will have fellowfeelings . . . '. 28 In this school of thought the way of transcendence is through the hsin, the 'heart' or the 'mind'. Such a doctrine owes much to Ch'an Buddhism and to other schools of Buddhism for whom the 'mind' of every man is fundamentally identical with the 'Mind', the Supreme Mind, which is the Absolute. The leading exponent of this school lived at a much later period. This was Wang Yang-ming (1472-1529). His method is that of 'self-cultivation'. This 'self' is such that its 'mind' is like a 'heavenly pool'. If it is clear, we have an intuitive knowledge of everything.

Wang Yang-ming drew a great deal of his doctrine from the Great learning (Ta-hsüeh) and from Mencius. He too had been strongly influenced by Taoism and Buddhism. But most important were the intuitions and insights that had influenced his development. We read in his biography that, after searching for a long time for the 'Principle' which was 'embodied' in everything and using the confucian method called 'investigation of things', he fell ill. But one day, aged twenty-seven, 'Hearing a taoist priest talk about the principle of "nourishing life" (yang sheng), however, he again became happy'. 29

A few years later, aged thirty-seven, while he was in exile, he received his great enlightenment. We are told in his biography:

Suddenly, in the middle of the night, the meaning of 'the extension of knowledge through the investigation of things' dawned upon him. Without knowing what he was doing, he called out, got up, and danced about so that his servants all became alarmed. Now for the first time he realized that for the Truth (Tao) of the sages, one's own nature is self-sufficient, and that it is wrong to seek for Principle (Li) outside of it in affairs and things.³⁰

It is impossible to present the teaching of Wang Yang-ming in a few lines, but we can cite a passage from his works which express the way in which he saw the relationship between man, Heaven and the Universe.

The mind of man constitutes Heaven in all its profundity, within which nothing is excluded. Originally there was nothing but this single Heaven, but because of the barriers, caused by selfish desire, we have lost this original state of Heaven. If we now concentrate our thoughts upon extending the intuitive knowledge, so as to sweep away all barriers and obstructions, the original state will again be restored, and we will again become part of the profundity of Heaven.³¹

If such an approach finds its roots in pure confucian doctrine, it is deeply affected by buddhist idealism which considers that there are not two realities but only one, which is called 'Mind'.

To a certain extent it is possible to say that for Chu Hsi, it was necessary to distinguish between 'Mind' and 'Principle'; but for Wang Yang-ming, only 'Mind' existed. In another passage from *Record of Instructions*, Wang Yang-ming states clearly that: 'The mind itself is Principle. So in the world can there yet be anything or any Principle outside of the mind?' This 'mind' is the original mind, which is termed by Wang, 'intuitive knowledge' or 'good knowledge'. This 'good knowledge', according to Mencius (VIIa, 15) is 'the knowledge possessed without the exercise of thought'. The mind' is the world without the exercise of thought'.

Throughout what I have written, one question is always just below the surface: the relationship of Confucianism to Christianity. ³⁵ Such a problem goes beyond the limits of the present article but it is good to mention it, for the gospel of Christ today finds itself face to face with a China which, while it does not think much of Confucius and his doctrines, nevertheless has lived by them for centuries. Modern beliefs, as much in continental China as in Taiwan, are all within the confucian tradition in that they are rationalist and idealist. Some philosophers such as the authors of the

Manifesto (who were mentioned at the beginning of this study)³⁶ have tried and are trying to build a revived neo-Confucianism by integrating elements from western thought. These trends stemming from, or inspired by, Confucianism are often specifically anti-Christian, but at times, also, sympathetic to Christianity. This world of thought is always in motion. What remains certain is that Confucianism, however humanist it may be, cannot repudiate an openness to the transcendent without also turning its back on its great master, the supreme sage, Confucius.

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NOTES

¹ The Doctrine of the Mean and the Great Learning. See 'God in Confucianism, 1', in The Way (April 1982), pp 134-44.

² Wing-tsit Chan: A source book in chinese philosophy (Princeton, 1963), p 115.

- 3 Wing-tsit Chan: op. cit., p 49.
- ⁴ Lau, D. C., trans.: Mencius (London, 1970), p 7. ⁵ Wing-tsit Chan: op. cit., p 49.
- ⁶ Mencius, 6A, 12. Translation in Wing-tsit Chan, op. cit., p 58. The chinese word translated here as 'mind' is hsin or 'heart'.
- ⁷ Mencius, 7A, 4. The trans. is mine. ⁸ Mencius, 7A, 1. Trans. Wing-tsit Chan, op. cit., p 78.
- ⁹ Wing-tsit Chan, op. cit., p 115. 10 Ibid., p 117.
- 11 Hsün-tzu, ch 17. Trans. Wing-tsit Chan, op. cit., p 117.
- ¹³ *Ibid.*, p 122.
- 14 Po-hu T'ung. The comprehensive discussions in the White Tiger Hall, trans. Dr Tjan Tjoa Som (Leiden, 1949-52), vol 2, ch VI, section 42c, p 387.

 15 Ibid., ch X, section 90, p 453.
- 16 Wing-tsit Chan, op. cit., p 450.
- ¹⁷ Fung Yu-lan: A history of chinese philosophy, trans. Derk Bodde (Princeton, 1953), vol II, p 411.
 ¹⁸ Ibid., p 411. Note by translator.
- 19 Ching, Julia: Confucianism and Christianity. A comparative study (Sophia University, Tokyo, 1977), p 82.
- 20 Fung Yu-lan: A short history of chinese philosophy, ed. Bodde, D. (London, 1961), p 268.
- ²³ *Ibid.*, p. 492.
- ²⁴ Fung Yu-lan: The spirit of chinese philosophy, trans. by Hughes, E. R. (London, 1947), p 189.
- 25 Literary remains of the two Ch'engs, quoted by Fung Yu-lan, op. cit., vol II, p 503.
- ²⁶ Classified conversations of Chu Hsi, quoted by Fung Yu-lan, op. cit., vol II, p 535.
- ²⁷ Fung Yu-lan: A history, vol II, p 573.
- 28 Fung Yu-lan: The spirit, p 194.
- ²⁹ From his biography, in Fung Yu-lan: A history, vol II, p 597. ³⁰ Ibid., p 597.
- 31 Ch'uan-hsi lu, or Record of Instructions, quoted by Fung Yu-lan: A history, vol II, p 601.
- 32 Quoted in Fung Yu-lan: A history, vol II, p 607.
- 33 Fung Yu-lan: A history, vol II, p 601.
- 34 Quoted in Fung Yu-lan: A history, vol II, p 601, n 4.
- 35 On these questions, see Ching, Julia, op. cit.
- 36 See Raguin, Yves: 'God in Confucianism 1', in The Way (April 1982), p 134.